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A little over a quarter century ago, Japan lay devastated. Her
cities and factories were wasted, her shipping was on the bottom of the
sea and a foreign conqueror occupied what was left. Today, Japan's gross
national product ranks third in the world and, if we are to believe some
experts, will eventually rank first. Her cities have been rebuilt, her
factories are among the most modern and productive in the world and her
ubiquitous presence is seen in every harbor in the world.
It has been a commonplace of history that a country with such great
economic strength has formulated policies to defend and expand its
interests and marshaled armies to support these policies. Post World War
II Japan, in the middle part of this century, has done none of these things.
She has not formulated a coherent policy defining the issues between her
and her neighbors on the Pacific East Asian rim. Many issues arising out
of the World War remain unresolved. And, as of 1970, her armed forces
ranked 22nd in size behind such countries as Italy and Spain.
The purpose of this paper then is to seek some of the answers behind
the paradox of great economic power without an apparent defense and
security policy commensurate with its visible interests.
Before discussing Japan's defense and security policy, it is necessary
to outline the nature of her policy-making process. The Occupation-inspired
Constitution of 1947 established the Diet (Parliament) as the highest organ
of state power and vested executive power in the Cabinet. With the exception
of a brief period during the Occupation, the conservatives have continuously
maintained an absolute majority in the Diet. They have thus maintained

control of the executive and legislative function of government. Opposi-
tion parties have never threatened this solidly entrenched majority.
This has led to a description of the Japanese parliamentary system as a
"one-and-one-half-party system. One party remains dominant and always in
power. It knows only how to govern. The other is a perennial minority,
unable to command more than one third of the electorate. It knows only
how to oppose, and at times seems positively afraid of power."
With no effective parliamentary constraints to decision-making, the
locus of the Japanese policy decision-making process then is to be found in
the conservative party. Structurally, the party is a collection of factional
2
alliances built around individuals. This leads to a certain instability.
Decisions must be made with an eye to the needs and requirements of main-
taining a coalition of factions sufficient to ensure continued party control.
The Prime Minister, head of the party and the government, must consider the
impact of policy decision on his own factional coalition and on the strength
of the "anti-mainstream" factions within the party who are trying to better
their positions within the party structure. "The intraparty decision-making
process of the conservatives . . . (thus becomes) the most important single
3factor of Japanese politics exerting influence on foreign policy."
The history of Japan's defense and security policy is then the history
of the conservative party position. Policy positions taken by opposition
parties are generally in opposition to the conservative position.
Robert A. Scalapino, Parties and Poli tics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley






Donald C. Hellmann, Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics (Berkeley
and Los Angeles, 1969), p. 14.

The Japan Socialist Party (JSP) is the largest opposition party.
The Socialists generally favor peaceful diplomacy based upon the
principle of "unarmed neutrality." They favor recognition of Communist
China, an ambiguous position on Korea and, while they favored normalization
of relations with the Soviets, they took a hard line on territorial conces-
sions. If followed, their position would lead to a renunciation of the
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and reduction in the size of the armed forces.
The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), an offshoot of the JSP, favors
a policy that on the surface is not much different than that of the con-
servatives. The DSP supports the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty but would with-
draw U.S. troops and bases from Japan. It has supported normalization of
relations with South Korea and favors normalization of relations with China
without breaking ties with Taiwan.
Komeito, the political arm of the Buddhist Value Creation Society,
advocates a Utopian "perfect neutrality" which would be achieved by a policy
of "cosmopolitic nationalism" in foreign affairs. Japan, in their world,
would fashion a policy of harmony with everyone and phase out the Japan-U.S.
security system. Her armed forces would be absorbed by the United Nations
peace keeping forces.
The Japan Communist Party (JCP) naturally favors normalization of
relations with the socialist states and abrogation of the Japan-U.S.
Security Treaty. At the moment, they are at odds with both Moscow and
4Peking in the world communist movement.
All of these policy positions have made little impact on the conserva-
tive governments of Japan. What then is Japan's defense and security policy?
4
Contemporary Japan , XXIX, No. 2 (March 1970) contains an excellent presenta-





Japan accepted as a condition for surrender the terms of the Potsdam
Declaration. These terms included the directive that Japan's military
forces would be "completely disarmed" and that Japan would be prescribed
from maintaining industries that "would enable her to re-arm for war."
The country was to be occupied until the allies were satisfied that this
was accomplished. As stated in the Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive
to the Occupation authorities, "the ultimate objective of the United Nations
with respect to Japan is to foster conditions which will give the greatest
possible assurance that Japan will not again become a menace to the peace
2
and security of the world ..."
The Occupation authorities under General MacArthur vigorously pursued
these objectives. Japan's armed forces were quickly disbanded and wartime
leaders purged. All defense-related industries were destroyed, shipped out of
the country as repatriations or converted to other uses. The allied powers,
specifically the United States, assumed in fact if not in law responsibility
for the defense and security of Japan. Diplomatic contact with the rest of the
world was curtailed.
The Occupation authorities considered constitutional revision essential
in order to provide safeguards against a revival of Japanese militarism.
This desire was conveyed to the Japanese government, and it was made known
that they were expected to come up with a new constitution. Initial
SCAP Government Section, Political Reorientation of Japan September 1945





Japanese proposals proved unacceptable to General MacArthur, and on
February 3, 1946, he directed the Chief of the Government Section of the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) , General Courtney Whitney,
to prepare a draft constitution. MacArthur' s memorandum on the subject
noted that he desired the following point be incorporated:
War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished.
Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling
its disputes and even for preserving its own security.
It relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring
the world for its defense and its protection.
No Japanese Army, Navy, or Air Force will ever be con-
ferred upon any Japanese force. ^
These principles were incorporated in the Government Section draft
4
constitution.
As a results, in its final form Chapter II of the 1947 Constitution
states:
Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace
based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the
threat or use of force as means of settling international
disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph,
land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential,
will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the






It appears that this permanent prohibiton of armed forces was not
advocated by the U.S. State Department, Japanese Government officials,
The Far Eastern Commission or the U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Com-
mittee. MacArthur attributes it to a suggestion by Japanese Prime
Minister Shidehara. However, MacArthur probably insisted upon it in order
to make retention of the Emperor system acceptable to allied opinion. A
detailed discussion of this question is contained in Theodore McNelly,
"The Renunciation of War in the Japanese Constitution," Political Science
Quarterly




This article represents a departure from the original draft submitted
to the Japanese and from initial Japanese drafts. During the Diet hear-
ings considering the new constitution, Ashida Hitoshi (Prime Minister from
March to October 1948) offered an ammendment to the article which was
accepted by the Japanese and . approved by SCAP Government Section.
Ashida' s ammendment modified the language by inserting the phrases
"Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order"
and "In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph." Ashida
later explained that this conditional phraseology was inserted in order
to make it possible for Japan to rearm for self defense.
The constitutional prohibition of "war" was not the only reform which
was to have an effect on Japanese thinking on security matters. Occupation
authorities also had the Japanese Government remove all restraints on
political parties. Among the parties that reemerged was the Japan Communist
Party. In addition, SCAP, operating under the Basic Initial Post-Surrender
Directive, had encouraged labor movement, especially critical transportation,
communications and electrical power unions. Labor, as a consequence, be-
came quite active during the period.
The Japanese Government, handicapped by Occupation-imposed dissolution
of national control of the police, saw potential economic and social chaos
as a distinct possibility. In fact, threat of a nationwide general strike
was averted during the Occupation period only by direct SCAP intervention.
This threat of internal chaos and the "no war" clause in the Constitution
were to play a role in the Japanese decisions on issues of defense and
security.
McNelly, "Renunciation of War," p. 370.

SECURITY TREATY DIPLOMACY: 1947-1960
Origins of Defense and Security Policy
Postwar Japan's most pressing problem would be finding a way for
Japan to exist as an independent political entity after the Occupation
ended. Early postwar Japanese governments were quick to size up the
emerging cold war tensions and shifted their thinking from projected
reactions to a peace treaty based on the terms of the Potsdam Declaration
to the possibility of one based on the new emerging bipolar world. They
could see the growing inef fectivenes of the Far East Commission and Allied
Council under the strain of cold war ideology and "as U.S. -Soviet relations
became ever more strained. . . (the Japanese Government) could sense that
the American view was changing to that of the need to guarantee Japanese
security as a part of world security."
During 1947, a number of proposals were made by U.S. authorities sug-
gesting that the time was ripe for the conclusion of peace with Japan.
Consequently, informal talks began with U.S. representatives discussing the
possible peace treaty and the related question of security. In response
to a suggestion by George Atcheson, State Department representative in
Japan, that it was quite possible that the United States might refer the
question of guaranteeing Japan's security to the United Nations, the Japanese
replied to the effect that "unless the organisation (sic) of the United
Nations was one upon which absolute reliance could be placed, there did not
seem to be any way for Japan to defend herself against foreign invasion
2
except by an alliance with a third Power." In this regard, then Prime





8Minister Yoshida noted: "our own ideas began to tend in the direction
of having the United States reinforce our defences, rather than relying
upon what was then the still problematical organisation of the United
3
Nations to assist us in the event of need (sic)."
Japanese views were crystallizing on September 7, 1947, when the
issue was discussed at length by Japan's leadership. During this discussion,
former Prime Minister Shidehara (who according to MacArthur was the author
of the "no war" caluse) noted that: "As far as I am concerned, I cannot
agree that we can expect much from membership in the United Nations. If
Japan is attacked by a foreign country, I don't think we can expect any
country to saciifice its own soldiers in order to defend Japan. The
United States may come to the aid of Japan, but if it does it will do so
4
in its own interest and not just because there is a United Nations."
Shortly after this meeting, Japanese thinking on the security problem
was clarified in a memorandum drawn up in the name of the Central Liaison
Agency by Foreign Minister Ashida Hitoshi and Chief Cabinet Secretary Nishio
Suehiro. The document subsequently was transmitted to General Robert
Eichelberger, head of the U.S. Eighth Army for delivery to Washington.
According to Yoshida, the memorandum handed Eichelberger:
. . . after stating the Japanese Government itself would be
able to suppress any internal riots or disorders, went on
to say:
'At this time of growing international insecurity, the
Japanese Government, as the most desirable means of pro-
tecting Japan's independence, wishes to enter into a





John K. Emmerson, Arms, Yen & Power, The Japanese Dilemma (New York,
1971), p. 63.

aggression by a third power; and at the same time, to
build up its domestic police forces, on the ground and on
the sea. Until the United Nations shows that it can per-
form the functions set forth in the Charter, we believe
that it is the wish of the Japanese people to have Japan's
security guaranteed by the United States. 1
This document was based on the idea that the United States
would maintain armed forces in the areas adjacent to Japan,
and that Japan would maintain bases within the country to
be made available for use by the United States forces in an
emergency.
While the hoped-for 1947 peace treaty fell through, the policy
decision outlined in the Ashida memorandum was to form the basis for sub-
sequent Japanese defense and security policy. Yoshida notes that "after
I had resumed position of Prime Minister again in October 1948 it (the
memorandum) was adopted by my Cabinet without change, although actually
there were no further developments in that direction until the coming of
Mr. Dulles to Japan in January 1951."
The alliance proposed by the Japanese differs from the conventional
idea of a mutual security alliance. Most alliances pledge the contracting
parties to come to the aid of each other if either is attacked by a third
party. The quid pro quo is obvious. The alliance proposed in the Ashida
memorandum would not pledge Japan to come to the aid of the United States
if the U.S. were attacked, but rather the United States would guarantee




II, p. 114; cited in Martin E. Weinstein, Japan's
Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968 (New York and London, 1971), pp. 24-25.
Weinstein also interviewed other postwar Japanese leaders on this point
and they affirmed that Yoshida' s statement was accurate as to the content
of the Memorandum. Yoshida presents a similar description of the content
of the Memorandum in his Memoirs
,
p. 265.
Yoshida, Memoirs, p. 265.
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The proposal rested on three assumptions by the Japanese: first,
that the U.S. -Soviet split would continue for some time; second, that
because of this split it was in the U.S. interest to defend Japan in the
event of attack and, third, that the internal threat to Japan was real and
that Japanese assumption of responsibility for containing this threat and
provision for bases was sufficient quid pro quo to ensure mutuality in
the defense treaty. If Japan could effect the policy outlined in Ashida's
memorandum, she could ensure her security and at the same time retain a
measure of independence.
1951 Security Treaty
By late 1949 the U.S. State Department was again seriously considering
a peace treaty with Japan. A punitive treaty had been ruled out, but there
still remained the question of how to ensure U.S., Allied and Japanese
o
security needs. The issue was finally settled by reaching a consensus
that the matter of security would be separated from the peace treaty and
the U.S. would negotiate separate bilateral security treaties with those
9
allies desiring them and with Japan.
With the outbreak of the Korean War, the necessity of maintaining U.S.
troops in Japan was keenly felt in Washington; in fact, Pentagon pressure
on this point threatened a swift conclusion of the peace treaty. The
As Japanese strategists predicted, U.S. thinking shifted from considering
Japan a defeated enemy to that of a potential ally. This policy crystallized
in a November 1948 decision by the National Security Council to deliberately
shift the Occupation emphasis to action ensuring Japan would be a stable
and friendly country when the Occupation was terminated.
g
Bernard C. Cohen, The Political Process and Foreign Policy : the Making of
of the Japanese Peace Settlement (Princeton, 1957), p. 12.
9
Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York, 1970), pp. 553-565.
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Japanese were in agreement. On May 3, 1950, Finance Minister Ikeda, on
the instructions of Prime Minister Yoshida, informed Joseph Dodge, with
whom he had worked closely during the early Occupation period, that Japan
desired a peace treaty as soon as possible and "believed that it was neces-
sary that U.S. forces remain in Japan after the treaty to guarantee the
security of Japan and Asia."
Whether this was known to Special Ambassador Dulles when he visited
Japan in mid-June 1950 is unknown. During these June meetings, Dulles
sounded the Japanese out on the issue of rearmament. On this issue,
Japanese and American views clashed. Prime Minister Yoshida claimed
that rearmament was impossible at the time because of economic problems.
Neither side found the meetings productive, and it appears that both
positions on the security issue were never fully explored.
Negotiations broke off with the commencement of the Korean War. But,
both sides had felt each other out, and the Japanese went to work on a
policy position on the security issue. In October, Yoshida had two draft
proposals drawn up. One permitted the stationing of U.S. troops in Japan
and contained a provision imposing a duty on the United States to defend
Japan from aggression. The other was a proposal to make Japan, Korea and
the surrounding area a neutral zone in which foreign troops would be
13
restricted. There is no evidence that the latter position was anything
Katoo Shunsaku, "Postwar Japanese Security and Rearmament With Special
Reference to Japanese-American Relations," Papers on Modern Japan
(Canberra, 1968), p. 65; meeting between Dodge and Ikeda recounted




William J. Sebald, With MacArthur in Japan (New York, 1965), p. 257.
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Katoo, p. 66; cited from K. Nishimura, Kempoo Choosakai .
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more than a bargaining paper and was ever considered a desirable solution
to the security issue by the Japanese.
In regard to the former proposal, the Yoshida Government considered
"It an axiom of Japanese foreign policy that South Korea must not be per-
mitted to fall into the hands of a hostile power." The Japanese could
see the necessity for the stationing of troops in Japan for the support
of operations in Korea. Since these troops served Japanese security
interests, the Japanese made a subtle shift in the defense policy envisioned
in the Ashida memorandum. Rather than providing bases in the event of an
emergency, the Japanese would provide bases on a more permanent basis. None-
theless, as Yoshida noted in his Memoirs
,
the underlying conception behind
the memorandum "was the same as that on which the U.S. -Japan Security Treaty
, nl6
was later to be based.
By November, the Japanese had a comprehensive draft security treaty
which embodied points made in the 1947 Ashida Memorandum:
1. Under the Charter of the United Nations and its
Constitution, Japan has the right of self-defense
against an unprovoked attack, and can cooperate with
the United States in accordance with the Charter, to
take necessary measures to repel aggression against
Japan.
14
Gerald L. Curtis, "The Dulles-Yoshida Negotiations on the San Francisco
Peace Treaty," Columbia Essays in International Affairs Vol. II (New York
and London, 1967), p. 49.
15rT .Wemstem, Japan s Postwar Defense Policy
,
p. 50. Weinstein bases this
assumption on the empirical evidence of subsequent events and an interview
with Nishimura. This position had not been publicly stated until 1969,




2. In the event that the United Nations determines
that armed aggression has been committed against Japan,
the United States agrees to take the military measures
necessary to repel such an aggression. Japan, in the
exercise of its right of self-defense, will cooperate
with the United States in repelling such an aggression.
3. In the event that an armed attack is made against
Japan, the United States and Japan will take necessary
measures of individual and collective self-defense to
repel such an attack in accordance with Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter.
4. Since Japan is unarmed, the Parties agree to the
stationing of United States forces in Japan, in order to
make possible the implementation of Articles 2 and 3.
5. A joint United States-Japanese committee will be formed
to facilitate consultation and cooperation on matters re-
lating to Japan's security, and on the stationing of United
States forces in Japan.
6. The treaty will be made effective for a period of
fifteen years.-*-'
The second round of negotiations over the peace treaty and related
problems of Japan's security began in late January 1951. Dulles and Yoshida
again clashed over rearmament. "The point in which America's special envoy
was chiefly interested . . . concerned in what way a Japan without any
armament to speak of could accept her share of responsibility as a member
18
of the free world." The U.S. side pushed for Japanese rearmament as part
of the free world security system. The figure of a 350,000-man army was
19
used. The Japanese, on the other hand, took the position that it was not
only at odds with the Constitution but was an economic impossibility.
The Japanese position against rearmament was not inflexible. They
were quite willing to cooperate in the defense of Japan and because
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Yoshida realized that "we could not discuss the treaty . . . without
committing ourselves to some effort to reinforce our defensive power
. . . we outlined ... a project, long under consideration, for in-
creasing both our land and sea forces and placing them under the control
„20
of an embryo Ministry of Defense.
This commitment did not completely satisfy the U.S. negotiators and,
consequently, the 1951 Treaty did not contain the specific provisions sought
by the Japanese but only an implicit de facto guarantee of Japan's security
by providing for the stationing of U.S. troops in Japan. The major point
was that:
Article I. Japan grants, and the United States accepts
the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of
Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land,
air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may
be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of the inter-
national peace and security in the Far East and to the
security of Japan against armed attack from without, in-
cluding assistance given at the express request of the
Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots
and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation of
intervention by an outside Power or Powers. ^1
Unable to secure a concrete commitment on rearmament, Dulles, worried
that the Japanese were getting a "free ride," secured recognition in the
treaty preamble that the treaty was "provisional" and that the U.S. Forces
would be maintained in and around Japan "in the expectation . . . that
Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense
22
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U.S. Treaties , III, Part III, p. 3331.
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1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
The Japanese Government, during the intervening years from the sign-
ing of the 1951 Security Treaty and the 1960 Treaty, attempted by
diplomacy to achieve what it failed to gain in the 1952 Treaty. It
pressed for an explicit U.S. commitment to the external defense of Japan;
consultation on defense matters, including troop and weapons movements
and, ultimately, a new treaty which would eliminate the reference to use
of U.S. troops controlling internal disorder and which would contain a




The principle joint agreement derived from the Security Treaty signed
in 1951 was the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement concluded in March 1954.
While the basic purpose of this agreement was to provide a legal basis for
the United States to furnish military assistance, the agreement gained
for the Japanese specific recognition of two points which had been proposed
in the November 1950 draft. First, the preamble placed the Agreement with-
in the framework of the United Nations charter. Second, although Japan
formally acknowledged a commitment to limited rearmament, she obtained
specific agreement that this commitment would be "consistent with the
24political and economic stability of Japan." Recognition that political and
economic cooperation and limited rearmament constituted a basis for mutuality
in providing for a common defense was a major achievement for Japanese
security planners.
23
,James W. Morley, Japan and Korea : America s Allies in the Pacific (New
York, 1965), p. 6 and Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, p. 64.
Weinstein reviewed these aims with former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Robert
Murphy (1952-53) who agreed they represented Japanese policy during his
ambassadorship.
24
U.S. Treaties. V, Part I, p. 663.
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The next step was to establish the principle of prior consultation
over the use of U.S. forces stationed in Japan. This principle was
established by two agreements reached during the 1950's. In May 1954,
Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru and American Ambassador John
Alliston reached an agreement whereby the United States agreed to consult
with Japan prior to the introduction of nuclear weapons. This arrangement
was put to the test a year later when U.S. Honest John missies with atomic
capabilities were emplaced in Japan. Their emplacement had the approval
of the Japanese; however, the Japanese exercised their right of consulta-
tion and warheads were not introduced.
The second instance of the principle of de facto prior consultation
was the establishment in August 1957 of the Japanese-American Committee on
Security. Comprised of the Japanese Foreign Minister and Director General
of the Defense Agency on one side and the U.S. Ambassador and Commander in
Chief Pacific on the other, the objective of the Committee was to discuss
all matters relevant to the implementation of the Security Treaty. Establish-
ment of this committee was the result of Japanese efforts to open negotiation
for revision of the Security Treaty. It was also utilized as a back-door
L • ^ • • 25instrument to begin these negotiations.
Two other happenings during the 1950' s were to influence the course of
events leading to a new security treaty. The first of these was the slow
but steady increase in the size and effectiveness of the Japanese Self
Defense Forces. The second was the return to normalcy in Northweat Asia
after the hot war in Korea.
25
This committee, renamed the Security Consultative Committee, is utilized




Because there seemed no option but to increase the size of the
defense forces in order to gain a mutual defense pact (a point recognized
in the 1951 Treaty preamble), Yoshida expanded the police reserve into a
100,000-man National Safety Force in 1952. This force was again re-
organized in 1954 into the present Self Defense Forces. Significantly,
9 ft
the reorganization legislation included "among the duties of the new
27
Security Forces that of repelling foreign invasion." Initial authorized
strength was set at 152,110. By 1958, authorized strength was 222,102 and
28
the actual strength was approximately 214,000.
Coincident with this increase in the size of Japan's armed forces,
tensions in the Far East subsided. This reduction of tensions led U.S.
policy makers to scale down their previous estimate of the size forces Japan
required to defend herself. By the late 1950' s, the rearmament issue was
not a serious impediment to conclusion of a new treaty.
The role of the Self Defense Forces in paving the way toward the 1960
Treaty cannot be overemphasized. Its growth during the 1950' s is at least
in part directly related to the diplomatic needs of the country in achieving
a mutual defense security pact. Since 1958, it has grown only about 12 per-
cent in size. Ground self defense forces have grown less than five percent.
Patient Japanese diplomacy and a change in the world situation brought
the United States closer to the Japanese point of view on security policy;
7 ft
The Defense Establishment Bill and the Self Defense Forces Bill. The
latter bill sets the mission of the SDF "to defend Japan against direct and










and, by the late 1950' s, the climate was right for the negotiation of
a new security treaty.
At Japanese instigance, negotiations began in 1958 and continued in
fits and starts through the following year and the new treaty was signed
29
on January 19, 1960. The new treaty sets the treaty obligations within
the framework of the United Nations charter. No mention is made of the
use of foreign troops to suppress internal disorders, and both parties
agreed that after ten years the treaty may be terminated on one year's
notice by either party. Articles III thru VI state:
Article III. The Parties, individually and in cooperation
with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-
help and mu tual aid will maintain and develop, subject to
their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist
armed attack.
Article IV. The Parties will consult together from time to
time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at
the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan
or international peace and security in the Far East is
threatened.
Article V. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against
either Party in the territories under the administration of
Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and
declares that it would act to meet the common danger in
accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result
thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of
Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated
when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to
restore and maintain international peace and security.
Article VI. For the purpose of contributing to the security
of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and
and security in the Far East, the United States of America
is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of
facilities and areas in Japan.
29
The subject had been explored at an earlier date. Prime Minister Kishi's




The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status
of the United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed
by a separate agreement, replacing the administrative Agree-
ment under Article III of the Security Treaty between the
United States of America and Japan, signed at Tokyo on
February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements
as may be agreed upon. 30
Article III contained the long-sought recognition from the United
States that Japan's guarantee of her internal security, her willingness
to provide bases for defense and limited rearmament were acceptable as the
quid pro quo for mutual defense. In Articles IV and V, Japan received
an explicit guarantee of U.S. aid for her external defense and security.
In exchange for this, Japan was required to act only in the event of an
attack on Japan.
Article IV, taken together with the statement in the preamble that
both countries recognized "a common concern in the maintenance of inter-
31
national peace and security in the Far East," '" provides an indication that
the Japanese viewed the treaty as serving their security interests defined
more broadly than just defense of the home islands.
Since Japan was not committed to act in any way, the statements referring
to a shared interest in the stability of the Far East could be interpreted
as window dressing except that the Japanese Government explicitly defined
the geographical area covered by the term Far East during the Diet debates
over ratification. The official unified position was that the area covered
is the area north of the Philippines, in and around Japan, Korea, the area
under control of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the northern territories
32held by the Soviets. Within this area the Japanese expect that the terms
30
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of the Security Treaty will provide for Japan's security interests.
From the Japanese viewpoint, the 1960 Treaty contained a defect.
The 1951 Treaty represented an explicit guarantee that U.S. troops would
remain stationed in and about Japan. Article VI of the new treaty, while
providing for bases, did not guarantee that U.S. troops would be stationed
there. It also placed no contraints on how these troops might be armed
or utilized. The Japanese desired to continue the de facto guarantee of
U.S. defense symbolized by these troops and also to ensure that they would
not be utilized in combat outside of Japan proper without Japanese consent.
The United States was unwilling to clarify these points in the treaty text.
Nonetheless, the Japanese were successful in establishing, by formal ex-
change of notes, the following principle:
Major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States
armed forces, major changes in the equipment, and the use of
facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat
operations to be undertaken from Japan other than those con-
ducted under Article V of the said (Security) Treaty, shall
be subjects of prior consultation with the Government of
Japan.
"
In the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and related prior consulta-
tion note, the Japanese had achieved what they had set out to do in 1947.
They had achieved an explicit guarantee of Japan's security while maintaining
a measure of independence.
In one final exchange of notes concurrent with the signing of the
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Japan explicitly recognized the
continued importance to Japan of the security of Korea and agreed to continue
in effect the arrangement signed concurrent to the 1951 Treaty permitting use
33
U.S. Treaties, XI, Part II, p. 1646-47.
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of bases in Japan for operations in Korea. This note deserves a closer
look. The original 1952 agreement stated that "if and when the forces
of a member or members of the United Nations are engaged in any United
Nations action in the Far East after the Treaty of Peace comes into force,
Japan will permit and facilitate the support in and about Japan . . .
forces engaged in such United Nations action."
This agreement represented Japanese recognition of the fact that such
support was in progress at the time of its signing and also that the
security of the Korean peninsula was important to Japan. Japan was willing
if not anxious to continue to support this agreement. In fact, in October
1958 Prime Minister Kishi publicly remarked to an NBC reporter that Japan's
35
right of self defense must be expected to include South Korea and Taiwan.
But, in 1960 the Japanese were less willing to provide the blanket
approval for the use of Japanese bases for support of United Nations actions
anywhere in the Far East given in 1952. Therefore, the 1960 Kishi-Herter
notes on the subject of the use of bases to support United Nations actions
limited use to those actions in support of the July 7, 1950, United Nations
Security Council Resolution; i.e. , to those actions ensuring the security
of the Korean Peninsula. Use of the bases was also made contingent upon
Japanese approval by applying the principle of prior consultation to their
use.
In addition to providing an indication of Japan's security interests,
the Kishi-Herter notes provide an indication that from the Japanese point
of view the operational, as distinct from the deterrent, role of American
34
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troops in Japan is to provide for the defense of the Far East as defined
by the Japanese.
This viewpoint gained further expression in the 1963 "General Defense
Plan of Operation"—the so-called "Three Arrows Study"—which according
to opposition politicians represented Self Defense Forces plans in the
event of another crisis on the peninsula. The study stated that:
In the case of another Korean Crisis, the SDF will fulfill
defensive assignments which include helping blockade the
eastern coast of China and supporting U.S. offensive action
by serving as a reserve force . . . During the emergency
period, all activity will be conducted on a basis of total
mobilization. J
The "Three Arrows" were to be U.S. forces drawn from Japan, Okinawa and
Hawaii.
The operational role of Japan's Self Defense Forces, now that it had
expanded to the point where it could be used as a diplomatic pawn in the
security treaty negotiations, was to provide for internal security and to
raise the threshold for any potential enemy inviting U.S. retaliation.
The Fight for Ratification
Japanese diplomacy had scored significant gains with the signing of
the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security on January 19, 1960. Most
importantly, the treaty represented an explicit guarantee that the United
States would provide for the external defense of Japan and that this
alliance would, through the principle of prior consultation on the use of
troops, not draw Japan into entanglements not of her own choosing.
The basic concept of the treaty was favored by virtually all members
of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Since the Liberal Democrats had
Tsukasa Matsueda, "Japan's Shifting Attitudes Toward the Military," Asian
Survey
, VII No. 9 (September, 1967), p. 614.
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achieved a clear majority of 287 members in the House of Representa-
tives (as opposed to 180 members for all other political parties) in the
May 1958 election, there should have been no problem in ratifying the
foreign policy decision. Instead, the treaty was ratified only after police
had forceably ejected Socialist demonstrators from the Diet chambers and
a mockery was made of the parliamentary process. Following passage, Japan
37
was racked by the largest and most violent demonstrations in history.
When the Kishi Government approached the U.S. Government about treaty
revision in the summer of 1958, the conservative Liberal Democrats were
split into a "mainstream" composed of the factions led by Prime Minister
Kishi and faction leaders Ono, Kono and Sato and an "anti-mainstream" group
composed of the factions led by faction leaders Ikeda, Miki, Matsumura and
Ismbashi.
While both groups favored revision of the security treaty, the factional
alliances took opposing sides on the question of whether Okinawa should be
included in the treaty area and other minor issues. The 1952 Peace Treaty
had placed the Ryukyus (Okinawa) under U.S. administration and Prime Minister
Kishi wished to include a statement in the revised security treaty acknow-
ledging Japan's residual sovereignty over the islands. Within the mainstream,
only the Kishi and Kono factions favored this proposal. The anti-mainstream
factions, for the purely political reason of embarrassing the mainstream,
favored delay on the whole treaty issue until the Okinawa issue was settled.
37
The most complete account of events surrounding the Security Treaty crises
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Since Kishi did not wish to delay negotiations, he had to come
to some accommodation. He and his Foreign Minister Fukyama spent the
winter and spring trying to hammer out a compromise. Kono, who had
ambitions to succeed Kishi, was dropped from the cabinet in January in
order to strengthen the hand of the Kishi faction, and Kishi moved toward
the anti-mainstream position on the Okinawa issue. An agreement on all
issues involved in the new treaty was reached only two days before
negotiations with the U.S. resumed and then only because the anti-mainstream
factions didn't want a public party split.
Kishi still had to gain complete support for the treaty within the party;
and, in June 1959, the cabinet was again shaken up and, in a deal for
support on the treaty issue, Ikeda Hayato was promised the support of the
mainstream in his bid to become the next Prime Minister upon retirement of
Kishi. His faction joined the mainstream and the Ono faction moved to the
opposition side within the party. (This deal apparently also included support
39for mainstreamer Sato as Ikeda' s eventual successor.)
The factional shuffling resulted in a 15-month delay in the signing
of a treaty, not because the conservatives were opposed to a new treaty but
because the policy decision became entangled in the intraparty maneuvering
for political leadership. The result of the delay was more far-reaching than
deciding factional positions within the party. The delay also helped spread
a feeling of anxiety over the proposed treaty, allowed the anti-treaty
opposition parties enough time to mount a strong protest and, finally, because
the feud weakened his position within the party, caused the resignation of
40










caught up in factional politics, the anti-treaty forces would not have
been able to mount an effective protest, public opinion would have favored
41
the treaty issue and Kishi probably would not have had to step down.
41
Ibid
. , pp. 149-152. Polls conducted in 1957 showed a consensus in Japan
in favor of treaty revision. By August 1959 only a little more than seven
percent of those polled favored revision.

NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS: 1952-1969
Background
The postwar world Japan reentered in 1952 was a different world
from that of the summer of 1945. The allied wartime alliance had broken
up and solidified into a bipolar cold war. The Communists had won the
Civil war in China and the Kuomintang Government had fled to Japan's former
colony of Taiwan. Two mutually antagonistic states had emerged in Korea
after it was granted independence.
These changes in the international situation were to impose immediate
problems for Japan. Japan had been led to believe that the question of
normalization of relations with the states of Northeast Asia which were not
signatories to the San Francisco Peace Treaty (China, Korea and the Soviet
Union) was an issue which she could attend to in a manner that was to be
neither hurried nor forced and which would be based upon her own interests.
The only qualification was to be that restoration of relations with non-
signatory states, undertaken during the first three years following the sign-
ing of the Peace Treaty, was required to be on terms substantially the
same as those with the signatories of the San Fracisco Treaty.
Restoration of normal relations with China, Korea and the Soviet
Union, while essential to Japan's security and commerce, would not be an
easy task. The events of the first half of the Twentieth Century had left
bitterness on both sides. Japan and China had been involved in conflict
almost continuously since 1894. Conflict over hegemony over the Korean
Peninsula had led to the Russo-Japnese War and, in 1910, to direct annexa-






Feelings resulting from the experiences during the first half of
the century run high both in Japan and throughout all of Northeast Asia.
Russia ranks as the least-liked nation. The negative attitude toward
Russia was expressed in 1957 poll where she was ranked ad the "most disliked"
2
nation by 31% of the sample. During the negotiations leading up to the
Peace Agreement, 60% blamed Russia for lack of progress, attributing it to
3
her high-handed and unfair tactics. Even today, this feeling appears to
be prevalent. A 1969 poll asked what country "Japan must get along with on
4
the most friendly terms from here on out. Only 2% mentioned Russia.
Japanese feelings toward Korea also run high. In a 1953 poll, only one in
three felt optimistic when asked the question: "Do you think Japan and
Korea can become close friends in the future?" During the ROK Treaty
negotiations, 1/3 of the sample felt Japan should "be tougher" as opposed
to 1/10 who felt Japan should "be milder" in the conduct of negotiations.
The Japanese felt no need to apologize to the Koreans for events of the
preceeding fifty years, and "no two people on earth liked each other less."
2
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Surprisingly, the same strong feelings do not apply to the Chinese.
The Japanese have a sentimental feeling toward China based on cultural
o
and racial affinities. They not only share a common written language, but
Japan borrowed much of her religion, art and philosophy from the Chinese.
To this feeling of affinity, some degree of a feeling of guilt over Japan's
actions in the late 19th and bulk of the 20th centuries is felt by numerous
9
Japanese intellectuals. This said, the polls still show that the Chinese
rank low in the esteem of the Japanese, along with the Koreans and Russians.
With this background of bitterness and mistrust, Japan>in 1952, faced
the task of making peace with the Russians and Chinese and of restoring
relations with the former colony of Korea.
Japan's response to the problems was to be mostly negative, reacting
to rather than proposing policy. Once the issues were drawn, they quickly
became ensnarled in domestic politics.
Soviet Union
Russia's attitude toward Japan in the immediate postwar period was
hostile. Late in entering the war against Japan, the Soviets seized the
northern islands of Kunashiri, Etoforu, Shikotan and the Habomais group
which had been administered as part of Hokkaido prior to the war. As late
as 1950, she concluded a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual
Assistance with the People's Republic of China which singled out Japan
by name as the potential aggressor. But, by the fall of 1954, the easing
g






The pact was directly aimed "at preventing a repetition of aggression
and violation of peace on the part of Japan."
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of world tensions evidenced in Europe by the Soviet unilateral declara-
tion of a cessation of the state of war with Germany was evidenced in
the Far East by announcement that the USSR desired to normalize relations
with Japan.
This announcement coincided with a particularly unstable period in
Japanese politics. In December 1954, dissident conservative politicians
united in a newly-formed Democratic party, managed with Socialist help to
unseat Prime Minister Yoshida and established a new government led by
Hatoyama Ichiro. Establishment of the new cabinet offered Japan an opportu-
nity to pursue new goals, and Hatoyama announced that a major goal of his
administration would be normalization of relations as part of a general
desire to settle issues outstanding since World War II.
Opportunities for new directions in Japanese diplomacy looked bright
when, on January 25, 1955, the Soviets formally requested that negotiations
begin for the purpose of restoring relations. Talks began in London on June
1. After initial bargaining, the Soviets dropped a demand for the
neutralization of Japan and offered to restore the Hobomai and Shikotan
Islands. These concessions met the minimum requirements set by the Hatoyama
Government for a settlement and propsects looked even brighter for
12
normalization. Suddenly, the Japanese Government reversed itself and also
demanded return of Etoforu and Kunashiri and suggested later negotiations
for return of the other Kuriles and Sakhalin. The Soviet refused and talks
were broken off.
12
Interview with Japanese negotiator Matsumoto Shunichi on January 20,





The rationale behind the Japanese shift in position lies in con-
servative party politics. The original Japanese policy position had
been made while Hayoyama was firmly in control of the situation. But,
conservative dominance of Japanese politics could not be maintained in the
face of strong Socialist opposition unless the two conservative parties
came to terms. Merger talks began in July between the Liberal and Democrat
conservative parties. Under this pressure for conservative unity, pressure
from the Liberal party opposition for a harder line in negotiations and the
hard line attitude by factions within his own Democratic party, Hatoyama
could not maintain his previous policy position and had to shift to a new
harder line on the territorial issue. "Little attention (was) given to the
13international consequence of the action."
The onset of negotiations with the Soviets caught the main opposition
party, the Socialists, at a disadvantage for two reasons. First, they had
been advocating the issue in general terms for years. Second, the right
and left Socialist parties had just begun negotiations for merger. Ideo-
logical differences over a strong Soviet stand might make this difficult.
For these reasons, the Socialists supported the initial London talks.
Their stand was virtually identical to that of the Government except that
they opposed any territorial concessions. As the conservative interparty
squabbling came to dominate the policy-making process, the Socialists
seized upon it as an issue with which to criticize the conservatives.
This tended to put them in an awkward position of genuinely desiring to
see relations with the Soviet Union normalized but of losing an issue if
they were. As a result, while the factional struggle continued in the
13





conservative party, the opposition party equivocated, providing no real
input into the decision-making process.
When negotiations reopened in January 1956, the Soviets suggested
a formula similar to that used in negotiations for peace with West Germany,
where territorial issues were shelved for later consideration. Because
the conservatives were now committed to a hard line on the territorial
issue in order to maintain the intraparty factional balance, this solution
was rejected. Negotiations broke off indefinitely in March.
In order to get the Japanese back to the bargaining table, the Soviets
applied economic pressures in the form of an announcement of fishing re-
strictions in the Soviet-controlled areas of the Northern Pacific. This
brought immediate results. The fishing industry was the main financial
prop of a party faction led by Kono Ichiro. Kono's support was essential
to maintaining the mainstream in power. The Government immediately
endeavored to solve the fisheries issue. Kono, in his role as Agriculture
and Forestry Minister, was sent to Moscow to work out a settlement. The
fishing issue was quickly settled, but the Soviets achieved their purpose
by tying the settlement to an agreement by the Japanese to resume
negotiations. Because it needed Kono's support and this was contingent on
the outcome of the fishing agreement, the Government resumed talks on July
31.
Although they agreed to resume negotiations, a compromise policy
position could not be worked out by the conservatives. As a result,
Foreign Minister Shigemitsu went to the bargaining table with little
direction. Shigemitsu was on record as having opposed territorial conces-
sions; however, he reversed himself and agreed that return of Shikotan and
Habomais would satisfy Japanese territorial demands in a Peace Treaty
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settlement. In reversing himself, Shigemitsu may have been bowing to
the realities of world politics, but he was exceeding his authority. In
fact, it appears he was making a play for support in a bid for party
leadership. Since Hatoyama's retirement was imminent, Shigemitsu'
s
action was probably "an abortive attempt to capture the prestige that
would accrue from the settlement of what had become a tiresome and
T „14divisive issue m Japan.
Since settlement on the terms accepted by Shigemitsu would have a
divisive impact on the mainstream party factional alignment, the Cabinet
ordered the talks broken off. On August 10, Hatoyama publicly announced
he would retire when the normalization issue was settled and a successor
chosen. This placed the issue of negotiation with the Soviets even more
squarely in the maelstrom of intraparty politics over the issue of party
control.
At this point, Japanese business interests, the financial strength
behind all conservative factions, fearful that the issue was tearing the
conservative party apart and would lead to a Socialist takeover, entered
the picture. In September, the largest employers associations issued a
public statement calling on the conservatives to reestablish order within
the party and suspend negotiations until the power struggle was settled.
Party reaction was immediate and intense, condemning business interference,
and plans for a settlement with the Soviets continued.
Hatoyama's announced intention to have the issue settled prior to
his retirement was coupled with an announcement that he would travel to








change in Japan's stand on the territorial issue. But, because of the
divisiveness of this issue, Hatoyama adopted the compromise formula dis-
entangling the peace settlement, resumption of diplomatic relations and
other issues from the territorial issue. This approach was adopted not
because it necessarily represented Japan's best interests but because the
conservative mainstream could come to no other agreement among themselves.
As the issue had become completely intertwined with intraparty politics,
these political issues had to be settled in order to secure support for
the foreign policy move. Thus, acceptance of Hatoyama's new position vis-
a-vis the Russians was contingent upon his immediate retirement and
retention of the entire Cabinet.
With Japan's foreign policy position finally settled, Hatoyama
journeyed to Moscow on October 15, and on October 19 the Peace Agreement
ending the state of war between Japan and the Soviet Union was signed.
With the exception of the territorial issue, the Peace Agreement
ended the state of war and settled outstanding issues between the two
countries. The Soviets accepted Japan as a full member of the international
community and, with this support (explicitly stated in Article Four), Japan
was admitted to membership in the United Nations on December 18, 1956.
The unresolved territorial issue continues to stand in the way of a
peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union. In the 1956 Peace Agree-
ment, the Soviets promised to return Shikotan and the Habomais group to
Japanese administration when a peace treaty was signed. On their side,
the Japanese have pressed continuously for return of Etoforu and Kunashiri
ever since their sudden shift in position at the London Conference. While
Ashai Shimbun, September 7, 1956: cited in Ibid.
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normal diplomatic relations have been maintained, direct negotiations
for a peace treaty have not been initiated since the 1956 Agreement.
Korea
Negotiations for normalization of relations with Japan's former
colony of Korea began at SCAP insistence even before the San Francisco
Peace Treaty became effective. They were complicated by the division of
the country into two mutually hostile parties and the immense bitterness
arising out of the Japanese occupation.
Because of the then existing international situation, negotiations
were conducted only with the South Korean Government. The Koreans were
of a mind to demand reparations scaled to the level of real and imagined
injuries. President Syngman Rhee was the "very incarnation of outraged
I r
nationalism" and "appeared to be obsessed with the danger of forgiving
the Japanese or allowing them to restore relationships in Korea." The
Japanese were as little inclined to give the Koreans any satisfaction,
especially after Korea declared a "fisheries conservation zone" around the
southern part of the peninsula which extended to as far as 50 miles offshore.
Japanese fishing boats violating this zone were seized or sunk and the
fishermen imprisoned. In fact, serious negotiations did not begin until
the Rhee Government was toppled.
Issues in the Japanese-Korean negotiations included recognition of the
jurisdiction of the ROK over the entire peninsula, the fisheries question,
status of the hundreds of thousands of Koreans residing in Japan, property
18










The mutual antagonism between the Japanese and the Koreans was to
have an influence in effecting quasi official ties with the North Korean
Government, permitting repatriation of Korean nationals residing in Japan
since World War II. This action was favored by the Socialists and other
left parties. Left wing organizations cooperated with North Korean attempts
through the General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan (Choren) to
influence the Japanese Government to permit repatriation of Korean residents
19
in Japan to North Korea. This pressure and the desire to be rid of the
Koreans resulted in an agreement by the Japanese Government to let the
Japanese Red Cross Society and the North Korean Red Cross Society work
out an agreement for repatriation of those wanting to return. This agreement
was signed in 1959 and has since been renewed as it expires. By the end of
20
1967, some 85,000 Koreans had been repatriated.
How much this policy decision was influenced by opposition party
pressure and how much by a simple desire to get rid of the unwanted Korean
minority is unknown. In any case, it does appear that government policy
had been influenced by consideration of opposite party pressures on this
issue even at the risk of offending the South Koreans. The sporatic
negotiations with the South Koreans did in fact break off over the repatria-
tion issue.
They resumed again late in 1960 after the fall of Syngman Rhee from
power. The new Korean Government took a much more realistic view toward
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This period of renewed Korean interest coincided with the Prime
Ministership of Ideda Hayato. Ikeda had emerged as Prime Minister and
President of the LDP in the turmoil following ratification of the
Security Treaty. Intraparty factional strife had played a major part in
bringing down the Kishi government; and, in an effort to heal the wounds
both within and without the conservative party, the Ikeda Government
adopted a "low profile" posture; that is, policies which would anger the
opposition Socialists and create dissention within the LDP ranks were not
attempted.
Ikeda apparently personally favored normalization of relations with
Korea and he had powerful support in the Kishi and Ishii factions of the
conservative party. Because of his personal interest in normalization of
relations, Ikeda was susceptible to pressure from the business community
for increased economic contact with South Korea. In the prewar period,
Korea had been an important market, and, with the nationalistic Rhee Govern-
ment no longer on the scene, business saw new opportunities. Ikeda was
pressured by South Korean sympathizers with the conservative party to
encourage business interests by supporting non-governmental trade missions
to the Republic of Korea "for the purpose of investigating possibilities of
private investment in order to pave the way for normalizing
relations.
Nonetheless, Ikeda' s position as President of the LDP was never secure
22
enough to force the issue. Therefore, until illness caused his retirement
21
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in the fall of 1964, the Government maintained a "low posture" vis-a-
vis the Korean question. Ikeda's successor, Sato Eisaku, younger brother
of former Prime Minister Kishi, for political purposes, adopted a "high
posture" in foreign relations, and negotiations for normalization of
relations began again, this time in earnest. •
Resumption of talks with the South Koreans brought opposition from the
left parties. As a general policy, they had long held the position that,
while they favored normalization of relations with the Republic of Korea
23because it would impeded efforts at reunification of the peninsula.
Direct opposition to the normalization of relations with South Korea
became apparent as the success of the negotiations became more certain.
Socialist critics were declaring: "Let the ROK-Japan normalization treaty
be the second round of fighting to follow up the struggle over the revision
24
of the U.S. -Japan Security Treaty!" These tactics failed to halt the
progress of the ROK-Japanese negotiations; and, by the spring of 1965, the
treaty, notes on proceedings and agreements had been signed.
All issues except basic diplomatic recognition were handled in separate
agreements and protocols. The basic treaty is the most important document.
During negotiations, the Koreans had insisted that the ROK be acknowledged
as the only lawful government on- the peninsula with jurisdiction over all of
both North and South Korea. "In the face of vehement opposition at home, the
. . . Sato government became extremely cautious about the wording of the
agreements and wanted to choose a flexible terminology by which it could
23
They also feared that normalization of relations with the anti-communist
South Koreans would draw Japan into a military entaglement.
24
Fumio Ikematsu, "The ROK-Japan Treaty and Political Parties," Contemporary
Japan
, XXVII, No. 3 (May 1966), p. 496.

38
more easily defend its policy of normalizing relations as well as its
25
stand on the status of the two Korean regimes.
The result was that the Japanese Government insisted on the follow-
ing language concerning sovereignty on the Korean Peninsula:
Article III
It is confirmed that the government of the Republic of Korea is
the only lawful Government in Korea as specified in the Resolu-
tion 195 (III) of the United Nations General Assembly. 26
The phrase "as specified" was inserted over vehement ROK objections.
The difference in attitudes is reflected in the different interpretation
placed on this article. South Korea stressed that Japan recognized her
jurisdiction over the entire peninsula since the North Korean regime was
illegal. The Japanese government argued that the treaty article must be
interpreted in light of the U.N. resolution and, thus, the treaty
application was limited to the area under the present jurisdiction of the
27
South Korean government; i.e., south of the cease fire line.
When examined, Japan's interpretation of Article III seems more
appropriate than that of South Korea. The United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 195 (III) declares that:
. . . there has been established a lawful government (the
Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective con-
trol and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the
Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in
which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside;
that this Government is based on elections which were a
valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that
part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Com- _
fi
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Prime Minister Sato, discussing the treaty, stated that Japan
recognized "the fact that another authority is actually controlling North
29
Korea (and Japan would deal with North Korea) on a case by case basis.
Thus, Japan had left herself an out in order to pursue her interests as
they arose.
With the exception of jurisdiction over Takashima, other issues
dividing the two countries were resolved to satisfaction.
The fiftieth Special Diet convened in October 1965 to consider the
ROK Treaty and related agreements. Factional politics played an important
part of the LDP strategy during the Diet session. The mainstream leader-
ship utilized their patronage position in order to secure unqualified
intra-party support for treaty ratification during the session. The
prestigious Chairmanship of the Special Diet committee considering the ROK
Treaty was assigned to Ande Kaku, an important member of the anti-
mainstream group with the LDP, in order to strengthen ties within the
party on this issue. Similarly, anti-mainstream supporter Tamura Hajime
was designated leader of the successful floor strategy which resulted in
passage of the treaty. This appeared to be a move to ensure that all LDP
31







, pp. 36-37. Active participation by party members was absolutely
essential because of the Tamura strategy to break the deadlock which had
resulted from Socialist and Communist opposition. Faced with a time con-
straint and the prospect of further opposition inspired delay tactics, the
conservatives kept the Diet in continuous session, and then just after mid-
night on November 12th bodily blocked all the approaches to the speaker's
platform. The speaker then called for a standing vote on a move to change
the order of business. (Everyone was by then on their feet and the motion
carried) With most of the opposition caught out of the chamber and the
speakers platform protected by the largest conservatives Tamura could find,
the motion to approve the ROK Treaty quickly carried.
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When the fiftieth Special Diet opened to consider the ROK-Japan
normalization papers, the left opposition led by the Socialists adopted
32
much the same tactics as they had during the Security Treaty Diet. Their
go slow tactics and parliamentary machinations eventually forced the con-
servatives to resort to quasi-legal methods to bring the treaty issue to
the floor in order for the conservative majority to vote it through. On
December 8, 1965, the treaty was ratified.
China
Because the allied powers could not agree on whether the Communist
or Nationalist government should represent China, she was not a participant
at the San Francisco Peace Conference. As a result, Ambassador Dulles and
British Foreign Minister Herbert Morrison reached an agreement that
"Japan's future attitude toward China . . 'must necessarily be for determina-
tion by Japan itself in the sovereign and independent status contemplated
33-
by the Treaty. '"
Events were to make a mockery of this understanding. The accord be-
tween Dulles and Morrison disturbed many influential members of the U.S.
Senate who were worried that, kept to herself, Japan might conclude a peace
treaty not in the U.S. interest (i.e., with Communist China). On September
12, 1951, four days after the signing of the San Francisco Treaty, 56
Senators signed a letter addressed to the President which stated: "Prior
to the submission of the Japanese Treaty to the Senate, we desire to make
it clear that we would consider the recognition of Communist China by





regime to be adverse to the best interests of the people of both Japan
34
and the United States."
The implications of this letter were not lost on the Japanese
Government; and, when Dulles returned to Japan in the fall of 1951, Prime
Minister Yoshida provided him with written assurances of his government's
intention not to conclude a bilateral treaty of peace with Communist
35
China. This assuaged the Senate.
As promised, Yoshida concluded a treaty of peace with the Nationalist
government on April 28, 1952, which came into force on the same date
as the San Francisco Treaty. This treaty displayed the same realism
expressed by Yoshida a year earlier where he stated: "Red or white, China
remains our next-door neighbor." In the treaty, Japan did not commit
herself to a recognition of the Nationalist government as the representative
of all China. The mutual understanding of both countries was that "The
terms of the present Treaty shall, in respect to the Republic of China,
be applicable to all the territories which are now, or which may be here-
37
after, under the control of its Government." Japan had left herself an
out. While conducting normal relations with the Nationalist government,
38
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Robert Taft, Joseph McCarthy, Richard Nixon, Wayne Morse, Karl Mundt, James
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Ambassador Sebald suggests that this tactic was adopted as the result of
a suggestion by Ambassador Dulles during a meeting with Yoshida December 10,
1951; Sebald, p. 286.
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The Japanese government was not enthusiastic over concluding the
separate peace with the Nationalist government. Yoshida was later to
remark:
As far as the Japanese Government was concerned, increased
friendship and improved economic relations with Taiwan were
naturally most welcome. On the other hand, it was our wish
to avoid, if possible, going too far in that direction and
manifestly renouncing the Peking government. . . . Suspicions
(about recognition of the mainland government) had been
expressed in the United States Senate. While the relation-
ship with mainland China was admittedly very important to us,
it would have been intolerable to have the ratification of
the Peace Treaty interfered by it. We had to make up our
minds in a hurry on the question of which government we
should conclude a peace treaty, and under the circumstances
we could not but choose the Nationalist Government.
.
While the overall goal of conservative Japanese governments has been
the hope that Japan would "ultimately . . . have a full measure of political
40
peace and commercial intercourse with China, the conservative position
quickly moved to what has been defined as the doctrine of separation of
politics and economics in Sino-Japanese relations. This position appears
to be the result of three major factors: first, the existence of the
Peace Treaty with the Nationalist government and the opposition of both
Chinas to a "two Chinas" concept; second, the insistence of the Mainland
government on making a political settlement contingent on Japanese
renunciation of ties with the United States and, third, the opposition to
any formal ties to Mainland China by both the United States and the
Nationalist government and pro -Taiwan members of the conservative party.
The success of this policy is largely dependent on the actions of the
Mainland government. Since Communist Chinese foreign policy toward Japan
39
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has been directed toward easing her out of the American orbit and
securing diplomatic recognition as the only legitimate government of
all China, the Chinese, not unnaturally, attempt to link economics
and politics.
During the period 1952 to 1957, a variety of contrasts with the
Mainland were carried out. Strictly private agreements on trade
41(totaling about $250,000,000 ), fishing rights and repatriation of war
criminals were successfully negotiated with official encouragement. These
informal relations reached their peak under the Hatoyama government.
Hatoyama himself favored relaxation of relations with China as well as
42
the Soviet Union ; but, any thought of formal relaxation was quickly
shelved because of the factional battle over normalization of relations
with the Soviets.
A highpoint in early Sino-Japanese relations was the signing of a
fourth private trade agreement in March 1958. This agreement was of
special significance because it was tantamount to a consular and trade
agreement. A permanent PRC trade mission was to be established in Tokyo
and granted diplomatic privileges including the right to use codes,
exemption from customs requirements and the right to fly the PRC national
43
flag over the mission headquarters.
This highpoint was in reality anticlimactical. The government of
Kishi Nobusuke had come to power in February 1957; and, while wishing to
maintain trade relations with the PRC, was attempting to redefine an
41
Because of Japan's adherence to C0C0M and CHINC0M export restrictions
actual trade was much smaller. It rose from 5% of the first agreement to
about 75% of the third.
42
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independent Japanese policy in relation to the U.S. security alliance.
With relations already cooling and in the face of strong Nationalist
Chinese pressure against concessions, Kishi announced that, while the
Japanese would '"respect the spirit' of the fourth private agreement and
provide 'support and assistance' within the framework of Japanese Domestic
44
law" , his government could not allow the Chinese to fly the PRC flag.
This assuaged factional dissidents within the mainstream who supported the
45
Nationalist government position, but the PRC cancelled the agreement.
It seems probable that the underlying motive for cancellation by the
Chinese was twofold: firstly, to influence the Japanese elections by
holding the Kishi government responsible for the failure of the grade
agreement and, secondly, to attempt to influence the conservative party to
adopt a pro-Peking stance through business' backers of the party. In
both cases it failed, and Sino-Japanese relations on both the economic and
quasi diplomatic level sank to token levels until 1961.
During 1961, while Prime Minister Ikeda's government was pursuing
its "low posture" in international affairs, the PRC abruptly changed
direction and signaled her intention to resume trade relations. (This
action was, in all probability, influenced by the economic necessities
arising out of the Sino-Soviet split.) The Chinese announced that trade
could be conducted on two levels. The first level was with "friendly






The actual pretext for cancellation was the destruction of PRC flag at
a Nagosaki stamp exhibit by a Japanese student.
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was "Memorandum trade." The purpose of Memorandum trade was to put
friendly firms trade on a large and organized basis. To this effect,
Takasaki Tansunosuke, former Japanese Minister of International Trade
and Industry, signed a five year barter agreement with Liao Chen-chi,
President of the China-Japan Friendship Society. This semi-official
agreement is important not so much because of the value of the trade
involved (friendly firms trade exceeded Memorandum trade by a wide
margin) but because the agreement represented implied acceptance of
China's "three political principles" for Sino-Japanese relations. These
were that Japan (1) would not be hostile toward China and (2) would not
participate in the "two Chinas" plot and (3) that the Japanese government
47
would not obstruct steps toward normalization of relations with China.
While semi-official in character, the Memorandum trade agreement represented
a step toward normalization of relations. Under the terms of two level
trade, Sino-Japanese trade expanded rapidly from $47.6 million in 1961
48
to $625.3 million in 1969—a thirteenfold increase.
In 1963, economic and quasi diplomatic relations with the PRC
reached a new high. In August, the Japanese government granted an export
license for the sale of a $20 million vinylon plant by the Kurashik Rayon
Company to the China National Technical Import Corporation on a deferred
payment basis. Payment was guaranteed by the Export-Import Bank of Japan.
The net effect of the sale was a form of foreign aid to the Mainland
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With the exception of opposition to the diplomatic privileges granted
the PRC trade mission in 1958, the Nationalist government had been offici-
ally ignoring the Japanese trade with the Mainland. The terms of the
vinylon plant deal, combined with the return to the Mainland of a minor
communist official who defected and then retracted his defection, per-
petuated a serious crisis in relations with the Nationalist government.
The Nationalist Ambassador to Japan resigned and the Charge d' Affairs was
recalled. In addition, Taiwan cut off all purchases in Japan.
This precipitated the usual crisis within the conservative Liberal
Democratic party. Because of the relative strength of the pro-Taiwan
membership of the mainstream faction (The four factions comprising the
Sato mainstream provided over 60 percent of the membership of the Pro
Taiwan Asian Affairs Study Group when it was founded in 1966.), Yoshida
Shigeru was resurrected from semi-retirement and sent on a mission to
Taipei to mollify the Nationalists. Subsequently, he signed a letter
promising that Japan would not again use Export-Import credits to finance
trade with the Mainland. The crises subsided.
Ikeda retired in late 1964, and the new government of Sato Eisaku
adhered to the terms of the Yoshida letter, refusing to grant Export-Import
credits for the sale of another vinylon plant and a freighter. Sato did
try to find maneuvering room by declaring that the letter was private and
hence not binding on the government during a speech on August 3, 1965.
However, the policy of not granting Export-Import credits was continued.
To do otherwise would seriously shake the mainstream factional alliance.
Trade had increased steadily with both the Mainland and Nationalist
Taiwan during the Sato era. In March 1968, Memorandum trade with the PRC
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agreement was renewed. As a condition of renewal, the unofficial negoti-
ators accepted outright Peking's "three political principles" implied
in the original Liao-Takasaki Memorandum. The Sato government was quick
to repudiate acceptance of these principles but, at the same time, again
noted that the Yoshida letter re Export- Import credits was only a per-
sonal document and the government would consider credits on a case basis.
While keeping this option open, the government has never been able to use
it since it lacks factional support on the issue in the face of certain
Nationalist Chinese opposition.
Nonetheless, as the 1960's drew to a close, Sino-Japanese trade was
approaching a billion dollars a year while trade with Taiwan was running
slightly ahead of this. In addition, Japanese business had invested
heavily in Taiwan.
Japan's policy of separating economics and trade with the Taiwan
government has payed off in economic terms. But, the contradictions of the
Japanese political process have made it impossible to adopt any policy to-
ward the Mainland beyond the vaguely expressed hope of eventually achieving
political peace and commercial intercourse.

JAPAN AND THE BALANCE OF POWER IN EAST ASIA: THE 1970'
S
Bipolarism and Regional Multipolarity
During the early part of the 1960's, seemingly little noticed in the
official circles of the Japanese government, a regional multipolarity
emerged in East Asia. China's independent nuclear capability and her
border clashes with the USSR had, by the end of the decade, confirmed that
this multipolarity was a permanent fixture; and, toward the end of the 1960's,
discussion of what direction Japan's defense and security policy should take
in the face of this new regional balance had become increasingly realistic.
When the Chinese exploded their first nuclear device in 1964, the
Japanese government, while recognizing the fact, minimized its importance,
and Prime Minister Sato was to state at a press conference on January 13, 1965,
that "the existing Security Treaty takes all possible contingencies into
consideration. I think that it is because this Security Treaty exists
2
that Japan has not become nervous about China's nuclear test."
A year later, in a study prepared for the Prime Minister's office by
the Cabinet Research Bureau, the authors concluded that, though Communist
China would have ICBMs by 1975, these would be no direct threat to Japan be-
cause of the U.S. and Soviet interests in maintaining a stable world balance
of power and China's preoccupation with domestic problems. The only fore-
seeable threat Japan might face would be to her internal security from
3
Communist Chinese-instigated insurgency.
John Welfield, Japan and Nuclear China (Canberra, 1970), p. 2.
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By late 1967, the Japanese were sufficiently aware of the emerging
multipolarity for the Economic Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry to
note that Soviet motives in desiring Japanese participation in Siberian
development were probably "to remove Japan from the umbrella of the United
4
States and at the same time to encircle China."
The move toward a more realistic discussion of defense and security
matters has accompanied Japan's increased status as a world economic power.
But, while the level of rhetoric and discussion became more realistic,
reflecting a recognition of multipolarity in East Asia, had the policy of
the Japanese government toward defense and security matters -changed?
In November 1969, Prime Minister Sato gave public expression Japan's
security interests in a joint communique with President Nixon issued after
a series of meetings discussing the "present international situation" and
Okinawa's reversion to Japanese administration. The communique states
that:
The President and the Prime Minister specifically noted the
continuing tension over the Korean peninsula. The Prime
Minister deeply appreciated the peacekeeping efforts of the
United Nations in the area and stated that the security of
the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security
.... The Prime Minister said that maintenance of peace
and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important
factor for the security of Japan.
In light of the current situation and the prospects in the
Far East, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that
they highly valued the role played by the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security in maintaining the peace and
security of the Far East including Japan, and they affirmed
the intention of the two governments firmly to maintain the






. . . the Prime Minister affirmed the recognition of his
government that the security of Japan could not be ade-
quately maintained without international peace and security
in the Far East and, therefore, the security of the
countries of the Far East was a matter of serious concern
for Japan.
Clearly, the Prime Minister was on record that Japan's security rested
on more than just the "self defense" of the home islands. He made the
extent to which Japan would go to protect her interests explicit in a com-
panion speech to the National Press Club.
Because of the prior consultation agreement, there has always been
some question as to whether Japan would respond affirmatively to a request
for the use of facilities in Japan in the event of hostilities outside
Japan proper. Since the prior consultation provision would apply to bases
on Okinawa, Sato specifically addressed this question:
. . . in the real international world it is impossible to
adequately maintain the security of Japan without inter-
national peace and security of the Far East. This is
where the second objective of the Japan-United States
Security Treaty comes to the foreground— the cooperation of
Japan and the United States in the form of the use of
facilities and areas in Japan by United States forces under
Article VI thereof for the security of the Far East in a
broader context.
And it would be in accord with our national interest for
us to determine our response to prior consultation regard-
ing the use of these facilities and areas in the light of the
need to maintain the security of the Far East, including
Japan.
In particular, if an armed attack against the Republic of
Korea were to occur, the security of Japan would be
seriously affected. Therefore, should an occasion arise
for United States forces in such an eventuality to use
facilities and areas within Japan as bases for military
combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy
of the Government of Japan towards prior consultation
would be to decide its position positively and promptly on






The maintenance of peace in the Taiwan area is also a most
important factor for our own security. . . . (If an attack
occurred that came under the purview of the US-Republic of
China treaty) it would be a threat to the peace and security
of the Far East, including Japan.
Therefore, in view of our national interest, we would deal
with the situation on the basis of the foregoing recognition,
in conncection with the fulfillment by the United States of
its defense obligations.
When closely examined, the Nixon-Sato communique and the Press Club
speech say nothing new about Japan's defense and security policy. The
Japanese government had always held that Taiwan and especially Korea had
been important to Japan's security (see page 21). The two documents re-
affirmed the Japanese belief that the operational mission of U.S. bases and
troops in Japan and Okinawa is to provide for the security of Japan by
acting as a police force in the areas of East Asia which are essential to
Japan's security.
The same policy statement is found in the White Paper on Defense issued
in October 1970. The paper, which created quite a stir upon publication,
noted:
The defense of Japan means specifically the effort to maintain
peace in and around Japan and protection of the nation's culture,
freedom, democracy, stability and prosperity. . . . The possi-
bilities of armed conflicts in the (Far East) are expected to be
influenced greatly by the moves of China which is developing
nuclear arms, the withdrawal of British forces from Asia and
increased Soviet naval presence and the way the Vietnam war will
be settled.
. . .
The Constitution does not prohibit use of force
as a means to defend the country. . . . japan's basic defense
goal is to develop a strictly defensive capability.
. . . This imposes restraints on the quality and quantity of
Japanese armaments.
. . . Japanese rely on the United States
for deterrence against a nuclear war or for strategic operations
in areas outside Japanese territory in the event of direct
aggression. (Japan's armed forces) will not be sent overseas.
Ib_i$L, p. 1430.
White Paper on Defense as summarized by the Japan Times ; cited in Survival
(January 1971), p. 5. Commentators have suggested that both ABM and ASW
weapons would fit this description.
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While the White Paper states that Japan's 22 year old security policy
has not essentially changed (i.e., Japan still relies on the United States
for "deterrence" and "strategic operations" outside of the home islands.),
the paper represents a growing realization that multipolar forces are at
work in East Asia. Publication of the paper itself, the first in the post-
war period, indicates that public discussion of defense and security
matters is now respectable. There is, in the. words of former Ambassador
Edwin Reischauer, "a growing feeling that the country can't avoid the inter-
o
national responsibilities that require a strong military force."
The White Paper also introduced a new element in defense thinking
—
the nuclear arms issue. The paper stated that: "Theoretically speaking,
it would not be impossible to possess small nuclear weapons, the capability
of which is within the minimum limits required for self-defense and which
9
would not cause other nations to fear the threat of aggression." This
statement is qualified by the assertion that "Japan maintains her three non-
nuclear principles (namely, not to manufacture nor to possess nuclear
weapons and not to allow them into its territory)" and relies "on the United
States for deterrence against a nuclear war."
The importance of the inclusion of statements concerning the accepta-
bility of nuclear weapons is heightened by events taking place in Japan's
economic sector. To meet power requirements she is developing a large scale
o
Japan Times (March 1, 1970); cited in Mendel, p. 1049.
9
White Paper on Defense as summarized by the Japan Times ; cited in Survival
(January 1971), p. 5. Commentators have suggested that both ABM and ASW
weapons would fit this description.
Ibid
. , pp. 3-5.
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nuclear generating capacity. Four nuclear power plants are in operation
and nine more are planned by the mid-1970' s. Because of this large
requirement for enriched uranium and dependence on imports, she is also
developing breeder reactors with the first experimental reactor scheduled
12
to go critical in 1973. By mid-decade, Japan should have a modest
plutonium 239 production capacity which could be put to weapons production.
Japan also possesses delivery system technology in her successful Mu rocket
13
which has been compared to the U.S. Minuteman. Japan's space program
plans to increase lift capacity by procuring Thor Delta rocket technology
14
from the United States.
For reasons which are both economic and political, Japan has not rati-
fied the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty she signed February 3, 1970.
Economic objections revolve around the International Atomic Energy Agency
inspection requirement. Strict inspection procedures for Japan's domestic
nuclear power industry might interrupt power supplies, and there is fear of
industrial spying by inspectors. Political arguments are tinged with a
spirit of independence in world affairs as well as stated explanations










"Japan's Rise in Aerospace," Aviation Week and Space Technology
, 95 No.
18 (November 1, 1971), p. 65.
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Intraparty wrangling within the Liberal Democratic party delayed signa-
ture for over a year. While Sato and his faction favored signature, the LDP
was badly split on the issue. The party squabble was not patched up until
early 1970. Interestingly, opposition parties all are against ratification.
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At about the time that the Security Treaty was automatically extended,
government spokesmen began to speak of "self reliant defense" and the Liberal
Democratic party publicly adopted the position that the "self defense (be)




Discussion of the nuclear issue, the rhetorical shift in emphasis on
the function of the Self Defense Forces, events such as the ritual suicide
of the rightest novelist Mishima Yukio and a recent spat of right wing
activity coupled with forces at work pressuring Japan to an active role
in East Asia have led some observers to conclude that Japan has changed
her defense and security policy in the light of the new regional multipolarity.
The weight of evidence, however, supports the opposite view that Japan's
policy has not essentially changed, only the options have become frighten-
ingly more attainable. On June 22, 1970, Japan and the United States
quietly renewed the i960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.
The Japanese government statement accompanying the announcement of
automatic renewal presented the view "that the Nation has enjoyed peace in
the turbulence of the world today and has achieved an unprecedented economic
prosperity and improvements in the people's living (as a result of the 1960
Security Treaty, and this) bears out the wisdom of the national choice made
18
on the course of external policy."
While the treaty may now be terminated by either party after giving a
year's notice of intention, there is no evidence that the Japanese are
in a hurry to either terminate or renegotiate in the near future. As
late as January 7, 1972, Prime Minister Sato told President Nixon, during
17
"LDP Policy Position on National Defense," Asian Almanac (July 25, 1970),
p. 4078.
For example see Nikamura Koji, "The Samurai Spirit," Far East Economic
Review , LXXIV No. 42 (October 16, 1971), pp. 22-25.
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55
their San Clemente meeting, that Japan would not abrogate the Security
Treaty even as the price for favorable normalization of relations with the
19
Chinese.
Treaty extension on terms which are the same as those negotiated in
1960 may have been necessary because of the factional nature of Japanese
politics (to maintain the status quo is the safest political move) and a
deeply held feeling that the Security Treaty has served Japan's interests
well, but it also represents the dilemma underlying Japan's postwar defense
and security policies. Japan's policy makers must consider her American-
imposed Constitution.
The Constitution Problem
At the root of Japan's difficulties in formulating a defense and
security policy is Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution. In it, the
"Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation
and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international dis-
20
putes . . . the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."
The meaning of Article 9 circumscribes Japan's entire postwar policy.
On March 30, 1959, a Tokyo District Court handed down a decision which
undermined it in its entirety. The issue came up in 1957 when several
Japanese citizens were arrested for trespassing at the U.S. Tachikawa air
base. The Tokyo District Court found them not guilty of violating the law
because the law under which they were convicted was illegally enacted in
that it implemented the 1951 Security Treaty which was itself unconstitu-
tional because it provided for the stationing of U.S. troops in Japan which
19





constituted war potential forbidden by Article 9. While this decision
only considered the validity of the law under which the trespassers were
tried, its practical effect was to judge the Security Treaty unconstitu-
tional and invalidate Japan's entire security policy.
21
The Supreme Court, in its only decision dealing with Article 9,
reversed the Tokyo Court decision but confined itself rigorously to the
constitutionality of the law under which they were tried and related
issue of the constitutionality of the Security Treaty. It did not touch
on the extremely sensitive issue of the constitutionality of the Self
Defense Forces.
The formal judgment stated that although Japan:
. . . renounces what is termed war potential; naturally,
the above in no way denies the inherent right of self
defense, which our country possesses as a sovereign nation,
and the pacificism of our Constitution has never provided
for either defenselessness or nonresistance. . . . (thus)
it must be said that it is proper that our country, in the
exercise of an inherent national function, be able to take
the measures necessary for self-defense so that we can
maintain our own peace and security and preserve our own
existence. That is to say, we, the Japanese people, under
article 9, paragraph 2, of the Constitution, do not maintain
what is termed war potential in the same article, but we
have determined to preserve our peace and security because
the insufficiency of our nations defensive strength pro-
duced thereby is not compensated for by trusting to . . .
'the justice and faith of the peaceloving peoples of the
world. ' ... If there are to be guarantees of the security
of our country in order to preserve its peace and security,
it is natural that we be able to select, in order to achieve
such aims, appropriate measures and methods regarded as
suitable under existing international conditions. Article
9 of the Constitution in no way prohibits a request to an-
other country for security guarantees for the maintenance
of peace and safety of our country. 22
21
The question of the constitutionality of the police reserves had been
raised in 1952 in a lawsuit by the Secretary General of the Social Demo-
cratic party. This court refused to hear the case and dismissed it on
a legal technicality.
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Hanreishu, XIII No. 12, 3225 (Criminal); translated in John M. Maki,
Court and Constitution in Japan (Seattle, 1964), p. 303.
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This stated, the high court skirted the issue of the meaning of
"war potential" on which District Court Judge Date had based his lower
court decision, stating that:
. . . entirely apart from the question of whether or
not paragraph 2 of the said article (Article 9) pro-
hibits the maintenance of war potential for the purpose
of self-defense, it must be understood that the war
potential prohibited by the said provision is that over
which our country can exercise rights of command and
control, that is. it stipulates the war potential of
our own country. 23
The court then held that "retention of United States Armed Forces
certainly be in accord with the intent of Article 9, of Article 98,
paragraph 2, and of the Preamble of the Constitution. "^
What the court did not do is rule on the question of whether Japan
could possess "war potential" for self defense.
Consecutive Japanese governments have held the position that the
renunciation of war contained in Article 9 of the Constitution does not
prohibit either the right of self defense or the maintenance of the means
to effect his defense.
As early as 1950, in defense of the establishment of the National
Police Reserve, the Government used the argument that "it was permissible
to devise means of national defense with forces that were not equipped
25
to conduct war." This philosophy underlies the growth of the Self
Defense Forces and is explicitly stated in explanations of their mission










p. 193. Development of this line of reasoning is
attributed to then Minister of Justice Takeo Ohashi.

58
note that the SDF "will remain strategically on the defensive. There-
fore, the size of the defense forces, the kinds of equipment and the
types of actions to be taken to meet aggression are strictly limited
?6
to the extent necessary for such self defense."
A significant percentage of Japanese experts on public law take an
opposite view. A 1964 poll among experts indicated that 88 percent felt
that the government interpretation and existence of the SDF was uncon-
stitutional. This same poll indicated a strong ideological bias among
the same group, with 70% favoring unarmed neutrality over revising the
27
constitution. This considered, the results of the survey still indi-
cate the existence of a strong body of legal opinion in conflict with the
government's view.
The unanimous Sunakawa decision clearly supports the Government view
that Japan has the inherent right of self defense. What is less clear is
the question of whether Japan can maintain war potential (i.e., the Self
Defense Forces) for self defense.
In the decision, no less than ten justices filed supplementary
opinions. While all the supplementary opinions agreed that Japan has a right
to self defense, a number went to great pains to distinguish between the
maintenance of armed forces under control of Japan and those under control
of the United States. The implication seems to be that these justices were
not convinced of the constitutionality of the SDF. Nonetheless, in the
formal judgment there is evidence that the court is inclined to uphold the
constitutionality of the Self Defense Forces. If "the pacifism of our
White Paper on Defense, p. 4.
27
Naoki Kobayashi, "The Japanese People and the Peace Article," Japan
Quarterly
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Constitution has never provided for either defenselessness or non-
28
resistance" then it seems that the court did not wish to deny Japan
of whatever means are necessary to effect self defense.
By strictly limiting itself to the narrow legal issues involved
and not addressing wider (more vital) issues, the court did not clear
up the issues surrounding Article 9, and it has continued to be a real,
though subdued, issue in Japanese politics. As part of the price for
unification of the conservative parties, the Liberal Democrats in 1955
pledged to amend the Constitution. In 1956, a Cabinet Commission on
the Constitution was established to make recommendations.
This commission conducted eight years of hearings and deliberations
before issuing its report in July 1964. In the report, the commissioners
agreed that Japan had a basic right to defend herself and that, therefore,
the existence of self defense forces was constitutional. A minority felt
that Article 9 could be interpreted as allowing Japan the right not only
to maintain self defense forces but also to participate in regional defense
pacts and, therefore, did not need revision. The majority, while agreeing
with the minority interpretation, held that Article 9 should be revised
because it was ambiguous, divisive of popular support and undesirable
29internationally.
There has been strong support for constitutional revision within the
conservative party. Prime Ministers Kishi, Ikeda and Sao all strongly
28
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supported efforts for revision before they were elected to party presi-
dency. But, once they achieved dominance in the party structure, they
ceased to aggressively push for constitutional revision, and considera-
tions of interparty factional balance has outweighed their ideological
30
commitment. There simply has not been enough pressure for revision to
cause the mainstream factions to press the issue. The safety valve pre-
venting this pressure from building up to the explosion point has been
the steady growth and general acceptance of the Self Defense Forces with-
out explitit court approval and the security afforded by the Japan-U.S.
security treaties.
The constitutional prohibition of the right of belligerency has much
deeper implications than just the limitation of the size or equipment of
31
armed forces. To paraphrase Mr. Justice Sutherland, powers of external
sovereignty, including the right of belligerency are necessary concomitants
of nationality. The rights of any nation in this area must necessarily be
equal to the other nations of the international family. If they were not,
the nation would not be completely sovereign. The real heart of Japan's
central problem in defense and international relations lies exactly in
this area. Article 9 of Japan's constitution renounces not only war but a
32
very important part of national sovereignty.
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Haruhiro F ukui, Party in Power The Japanese Liberal Democrats and
Policy Making (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1970), pp. 215-222.
"United States v. Curtiss Wright Export Corporation," 299 U.S. 304; 81L.
Ed. 255; Sup. Ct. 216. 1936.
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Japan is not the only nation to renounce war. The French constitution
of 1791 (Ch 6) noted that France "will renounce all war with the objective
of conquest and never resort to arms against the freedom of any nation."
It appears though that the war the French renounced was a war of aggres-
sion and not the right of belligerency of the state.
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Because of the uncertainty over the issue, Japan stands at a dis-
advantage, an inequality, in dealing with other nations—a point that
surely cannot be missed by practitioners of realpolitik in Peking or
Moscow. This point is well illustrated in Japan's relations with South
Korea. For much of the 1950' s, the South Koreans established a closed
fishing zone— the Rhee line— in the Korean Straits and the Sea of Japan.
Japanese fishing boats were seized or sunk with impunity in international
waters. Having renounced belligerency the Japanese stood by helplessly,
able only to complain and negotiate for cessation at a disadvantage.
The manner in which the Japan-U.S. security treaties were negotiated
and the nature of the security contract between the two countries is an
effect of this self-imposed prohibition. This, of course, is not to say
that the security contract would have been different if Article 9 didn't
exist. The point is that because of Article 9 from the Japanese viewpoint
the nature of the security treaty is the only possible solution to their
problem. ..
Discussion of revision of Article 9 in Japan has generally centered
around the question of the constitutionality of the Self Defense Forces;
the wider implications of renunciation of the right of belligerency has
received scant consideration. But here lies the real complication in
efforts at stabilizing relationships in East Asia.
The Japanese could begin their discussion by looking at the simple
truth of Justice Sutherland's comments. They probably will not; the issue
is too emotional, too divisive for that. A peculiarly Japanese solution
has been suggested by Mr. Chief Justice Tanaka in his supplementary opinion
to the Sunakawa decision. He noted t
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The fact that as a general rule nations possess the
right of self-defense for the sake of their survival is
widely accepted. . . . The decision of the means to be
selected and the degree of perfection and the structure
of the power of self-defense must consider world con-
ditions at the time and other circumstances ; it is a purely
political question which is left to the discretion of the
government. . . Moreover, a country's self-defense is a
moral responsibility in international society. Today the
relationship of mutual solidarity among the various peoples
had broadened and deepened to the point that a crisis for
one people necessarily and directly affects other peoples.
. . . today there no longer exists the concept of self-
defense in the strict meaning of the term. The connection
is simply this: self-defense is the defense of others;
defense of others is self-defense. Accordingly, it must
be recognized that though it be defense of one's own country
or cooperation in the defense of other countries, each
country bears a responsibility
.
33
This solution to the problem of the powers of external sovereignty
inherent in the right of belligerency of the State could provide an effec-
tive way to solve the problems of security inherent in Japan's Constitu-
tion, whether Japan solves the constitution problem in this manner or
by squarely recognizing the truth of Justice Sutherland's observation
probably will not make much difference in the long run.
While constitutional issues have been debated, Japan has built up a
fair sized modern conventional army. In this effort, she has been
encouraged and aided by the United States. The size and mission of this
force has been circumscribed by the government's interpretation of the
meaning of Article 9, and they have looked to the security relationship
with the United States to provide for their interests in the Far East.
Armies exist to serve the interests of the state. The crises will come





disadvantage of having renounced the right of belligerency. What course
will the world's second or third largest economic power then pursue? It
seems that unless the Japanese come to grips with the constitution problem
in the near future they run the almost certain risk of grave constitu-
tional crises at the worst moment and the distinct possibility of being
unable to cope with the real problems of the emerging multipolar world
which will lead to the war they renounced in 1947.
Pressures for Participation
Despite the constitution problem and the inhibiting effect of factional
party politics, there are pressures at work pushing Japan toward a realistic
participation in the multipolar East Asian world,
Japan is the economic giant of the region. She is the number one or
number two largest trading partner of every country in the region, except the
USSR. By the middle of the decade of the 1960's, Japan had cornered 36.4% of
the trade of South Korea, 33.4% of Taiwan's trade, 12.4% of Mainland China's
trade and 60% of North Korea's trade. An important aspect of this trade
is Japan's growing dependence on imports of items she previously exported.
In 1966, Japan became a net importer of raw silk and a year later of cotton
35
yarn. This dependency on imports from less-developed nations, principally
Taiwan and South Korea, increases interest in their stability. Japan is
also the largest dispenser of economic assistance in Asia. In 1968, total
Japanese economic aid to less-developed countries exceeded one billion
dollars ($1,049 billion), $1,263 billion in 1969 and $1.8 billion in 1970.
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Japan's total aid should surpass that of the United States by mid 1970;
i.e., 1% of projected $400 billion GNP. Of this aid, approximately half
is extended to Asian nations: $500.3 million in 1968, $559.0 million in
1969 and $847.4 million in -1970. She has also taken the leading role in
the Asian Development Bank, matching the capital investment of the United
States. In addition, Japan is a member of the Asian and Pacific Council
(ASPAC) and has hosted or participated in numerous development conferences.
Japan has taken pains to avoid political inferences from her member-
ship in regional associations such as ASPAC. This has created difficulties.
A good example is the recent Djakarta Conference. Japan was reluctant to
participate because of its regional military connotations; yet, fortunately,
the conference produced a sufficiently bland statement to preclude the neces-
sity of positive action. What Japan's response would have been if the con-
ference had instead recommended intervention in Cambodia is hard to predict.
Nonetheless, with Japan's large regional involvement on an economic basis
level, it is impossible to see how the Japanese can but be interested in
the political stability of East and Southeast Asia. Should Japan be called
upon for aid by one of her trading partners, she would suffer immense loss
of influence and risk political and economic isolation if she failed to
respond.
The East Asian country with which Japan's interests most likely might
clash is Mainland China. Japan's interest in the stability of the East
and Southeast Asia has not been lost on Peking. Chinese apprehension over
the form this interest might take is heightened by her view that the Nixon




hands. This apprehension was not helped by President Nixon's statement of
the role of the Japanese expressed in his February 1970 state of the world
address
:
. . . our cooperation with Japan will be crucial to our efforts
to help other Asian nations develop in peace. Japan's partner-
ship with us will be a key to the success of the Nixon Doctrine
in Asia. 37
Prime Minister Sato's fall 1969 explicit statement of Japan's security
interests further alarmed the Chinese.
During the fall of 1969 and through 1971, the "revival of Japanese
militarism" became a major regional foreign policy concern for the Communist
Chinese. A content analysis of the Peking Review revealed that, after the
Sato communique, the most visible topic shifted from American Indochina
38
imperialism to Japan. Prior to this period, what attention that was
payed to Japan shifted from Soviet-Japanese "collaboration" to Japanese-
American relations, charges of militarism and Japanese regional security
involvement. The Chinese see the Japanese as inheriting the position of the
United States as the prop of regional stability. This growing tension with
nuclear-armed China heightens the need to increase contact with the Mainland.
The reversion of the Ryukyus on May 15, 1972, puts Japan closer to the
center of regional multipolar politics. It poses two serious security
problems. First, Japan has assumed responsibility for defense of a large
new area. Initial arrangements call for gradual stationing of Self Defense
Forces in the Okinawa area and assumption of complete responsibility for
37"
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defense of a large new area. Initial arrangements call for gradual
stationing of Self Defense Forces in the Okinawa area and assumption of
39
complete responsibility for defense prior to July 1, 1973. Second,
reversion presents Japan with a new complication in her relationship with
China. Both Chinas claim the Senkaku (Tiaoyu) Islands which were returned
to Japanese administration. Reaction to the reversion agreement was prompt
and strong by both Chinese governments. The People's Daily denounced the
"dirty deal" and warned that "no insidious strategims . . . can alter the
fact that the Taioyu and other islands are an inalienable part of China's
40
sacred territory." The issue is further complicated by the fact that
possible major oil deposits have been discovered in the vicinity of the
Senkakus.
The Japanese, sensitive to territorial issues, flatly stated on
March 5, 1971, that the Senkakus belonged to Japan; and, thus there was no
41
question of negotiation over their jurisdiction with the Chinese, and they
have pledged that the Japanese coast guard will patrol the area to prevent
42
encroachment. Because of the sovereignty issue, the United States, in
returning the Senkakus to Japanese administration, stated that it was return-
43
ing them without judgment on sovereignty. The Japanese are now faced with
their first frontal confrontation with the Chinese over an issue both countries
are extremely sensitive to— the territorial one.
39
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Whatever the Japanese do in normalizing relations with Mainland
China, it will involve them more deeply in regional politics and pose
security problems.
Japan must still solve the problem of the two Chinas. She supported
efforts to gain de facto recognition of both Chinas during the United
Nations admission procedure for Mainland China.
From a strictly security oriented view, Japan may prefer to have the
Nationalist buffer between her and the Mainland. This was at least
implicitly implied in the 1969 joint Nixon-Sato communique where mainten-
ance of peace in Taiwan was termed "most important" to Japanese security
interests. The issue is complicated by Japanese trade with both Chinas.
Japanese trade with Taiwan in 1970 amounted to close to a billion dollars
($953,000,000). Trade with mainland China amounted to about $825,000,000
44
in the same year. Trade is quite favorable to Japan, running a 3 to 1
balance in her favor. Communist Chinese trade policies have kept the
balance of trade with the Mainland at much less favorable levels.
The issue is complicated by the existence of the 1952 Peace Treaty with
the Nationalist government. President Chiang, on June 8, 1968, himself
announced that "if the Japanese government should decide to establish diplo-
matic ties with the Chinese Communists, then Japan would have to break off
its diplomatic ties with the Republic of China first. In such an eventu-
45
ality, I would declare the Peace Treaty null and void." ' In this eventu-
ality, the Japanese would have to renegotiate a peace treaty with the Peking
44
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government, and this would undoubtedly involve issues of reparations,
the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and sovereignty over the Ryukyus.
Pressure to come to grips with the new regional multipolarity also is
felt from the Soviet Union. As a result of a policy of general detente,
the USSR has been pressuring the Japanese for the peace treaty which was
not signed in 1956. Deadlock on the Northern territories issues is still
the major point blocking improved relations. Soviet laws have not changed
appreciably and no resolution on the issue was obtained during talks be-
46
tween Foreign Minister Aichi and Soviet Premier Kosygin in September 1969.
Since the territorial issue is still able to create a political crisis,
normalization here is probably dependent on Soviet willingness to compromise,
Because of the special relationship built up over the past quarter
century, Japan is most sensitive to pressures from the United States.
The United States is exerting pressure upon Japan for more active
participation in multipolar East Asia. The now famous Nixon doctrine is a
subtle form of this. At the same time that Prime Minister Sato was re-
asserting his faith in the old relationship, Mr. Nixon was enunciating the
policy that:
The United States will keep all of its treaty commitments. . . .
We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the
freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose
survival we consider vital to our security. ... In cases in-
volving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military
and economic assistance in accordance with our treaty commit-
ments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened
to assume the primary responsibility of providing the man-
power for its defense. 47
The signal being flashed is that the bipolar period is over and, as a
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result, the United States is reducing her commitment to act as the
physical prop for stability in the East Asian area. In view of the
dependence on the U.S. to provide for Japan's security interests outside
the home islands, this signal should have provided an incentive for a
rethinking of defense and security matters. But, its impact has been
diluted by the decision of both governments to quietly renew the 1960
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security when it expired on June 22, 1970.
During 1971, the United States provided additional incentive for par-
ticipation in regional affairs in the form of the "Nixon shocks." The
July 17 announcement of the President's China visit caught the Japanese
government off guard. Relations were also strained by the various "dollar
shocks." The year started with Japan embroiled in the textile problem
which finally was settled, forcing a 30% cutback in Japanese manufacturing.
The net effect of the August dollar flotation and 10% surcharge was to
48force a reduction in the planned 10% growth of Japan's GNP to about 7%.
Prime Minister Sato, in his 1971 New Year's Day message, noted that
49
"Japan has no diplomacy unless we come to grips with the China problem."
The shocks of 1971 are forcing rethinking of the question of Japan's rela-
tions with China. Not surprisingly, the question of a new policy quickly
became embroiled in intraparty conservative politics, which are sharpened
by the expected retirement of Prime Minister Sato. At the beginning of the
year, only the anti-mainstream Miki faction was actively supporting a
policy of recognizing Mainland China as the only legitimate government of
49
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China. After the "Nixon shocks," mainstream leader Nakasone and some
minor factions switched support to this position. At the conclusion of
Nixon's visit, Sato's main supporter and Foreign Minister, faction leader
Fukuda, announced support for recognition of the Mainland government. The
"dollar shocks" also seriously weakened the position of Mr. Tanaka, the
head of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, a Sato stalwart
who is possibly in line for the Prime Ministership. Whatever the outcome
of the intrparty strife, it seems certain that some changes in direction
of conservative thought on the question of normalization of relations will
result.
But, for Japan to take a position of leadership (or even cope success-
fully) with the new regional multipolarity in East Asia is going to take more
than a decision to recognize the Mainland Chinese government. If Japan is
to effectively cope with the new regional realities, she must be able to
negotiate equally with the great regional powers. To do so will require a
rethinking of defense and security matters. To live in the uncertain East
Asian world, where resort to force has been so common in the past, without
the military strength to protect her interests would be anomalous.

CONCLUSION
For twenty years, the cornerstone of Japan's defense and security
policy has been the bilateral security treaty with the United States. The
basic outline of this agreement was not cooked up whole in Washington and
and served to the Japanese; rather, its Japanese origins go back as early
as 1947. Since then it has served the security interests of both countries.
From the Japanese viewpoint, it has served not only as a deterrent against
outright aggression but to provide for Japanese security interests in East
Asia.
While not publicly stressing the latter point, the Japanese Government
has vigorously defended its policy choice, stressing the economic benefits
of a low defense budget and the security gained under the American umbrella,
The value of the treaty has not been lost on the public either. Polls con-
ducted just prior to automatic extension of the treaty in 1970 indicated
that extension was -favored two to one over abrogation by the man in the
1
street.
The treaty system has two side effects which deserve realistic discus-
sion inside Japan. First, the protection afforded by the treaty system has
permitted the Japanese to subordinate efforts at normalization of relations
with neighboring states to the vicissitudes of factional party politics
without seriously threatening the country's security interests. Because of
the security enjoyed under the alliance, there has been no real pressure to
come to grips with the complex security questions involved in these issues.
Douglas H. Mendel, "Japanese Defense in the 1970' s: The Public View,"
Asian Survey X No. 12 (December 1970), p. 1059.
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Major foreign policy decisions, especially those of a security nature, are
divisive in terms of factional unity and provide the opposition parties
with an issue. For this reason, they are avoided if possible; and when
they canot be avoided they are not considered on their objective merits.
Rather, they are considered in terms of the impact on factional politics.
The second major side effect of the security treaty system is that
the system by providing, in Mr. Sato's words, for "all possible contingencies"
has obscured the deeper constitutional problems involved in Japan's security
policy. The Supreme Court decision in the Sunakawa case, while deciding
that the constitution does not bar the right of self defense and judging
the treaty system to be a constitutional exercise of this right, did not
settle the larger issue of whether the country could maintain war potential
for self defense and whether the country did (or could) renounce the
sovereignty implicit in the right of belligerency. The net effect of the
security treaty has been to allow the Japanese to avoid these more basic
issues
.
Given the factional nature of party politics and the divisiveness of
the constitutional issues surrounding Article 9, the course in defense and
security policy charted in 1947 was probably the wisest one. The country's
remarkable economic progress is in part attributable to the low material
cost of resources for defense and the political stability provided by the
general acceptance of the policy.
But, if this great economic power is to become a great regional and
world power, it must soon come to grips with the great questions which the
security treaty has permitted to remain in the background. As we have seen,
there are pressures at work to move Japan toward a reassessment of defense
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and security policy. The most important of these is the emerging multi-
polarity in the world. The present Japan-United States security system is
founded upon the assumption that world politics is essentially bipolar.
In the bipolar world of the late 1940' s and 1950' s, Japan could safely risk
the assumption that the security of Japan was .essential to the security of
the United States and base her policies on this fact.
The security of Japan _is still essential to the United States. But the
preeminent fact of world politics is no longer the mutual antagonism of the
two nuclear armed superpowers. While there is no reason that the security
treaty system cannot continue to serve Japanese interests in the new multi-
polar world reality, the assurance that it will is less certain. It seems
certain that, while the basic interests in Asian stability held by Japan
and the United States will remain compatible, they will not necessarily be
identical. This thought is implicit in the Nixon doctrine.
United States foreign policy further encourages Japan to seek new roles
and normalize relationships in East Asia. The President noted this in his
1972 report to Congress on United States foreign policy for the 1970' s:
. . . autonomous policies need not create strains in our
relationship so long as we both recognize the need to mesh
these policies. Both the autonomy and the basic harmony
of our actions are implicit and essential elements in the
new relationship of equality and reciprocity which we seek
with Japan.
2
The report to the Congress implicitly recognizes the previous statement that,
while the security interests of both countries will remain compatible, they
will not necessarily be identical. This undoubtedly gives some pause to
2
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Japan's leadership. Japan has assumed that the Security Treaty relation-
ship will ensure Japan's security interests in the "Far East." A growing
skepticism exists today in Japan over whether the relationship will con-
3
tinue to protect Japanese interests. The uncertain resolution of the
Vietnam war and the growing detente between Washington and Peking and
Moscow can't help but feed this skepticism. If this skepticism induces a
new look of defense and security policy and its side effects it will be
healthy. On the other hand, if this skepticism should turn to a feeling
of being abandoned by the United States, it will have just the opposite
effect.
There is in Japan a strong sense of nationalism and a desire to be
treated as an equal. Prime Minister Yoshida's great concern in negotiating
the 1952 Security Treaty was to secure recognition that Japan was negotiating
4
as an equal and not as a dependent or vanquished nation. To the credit of
Truman and Acheson, Japan was treated as an equal. This theme of nationalism
and desire for equal treatment runs deep in Japanese policy. According to
former Ambassador Reischauer, not to treat Japan as an equal would be the
greatest possible shock.
3
Douglas Mendel's latest tabulation of public opinion in his article in
Asian Survey ("Japanese Defense in the 1970' s: The Public View") notes that
39 percent of those sampled no longer believed that the United States would
come to Japan's aid in an emergency. Thirty percent still had faith. While
much of this skepticism is reflected in Socialist voters, a surprising number
of LDP voters were also skeptical. Only 9 percent more LDP voters felt that
the U.S. commitment was substantial than those who expressed skepticism.
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If the United States abrogated or drastically changd its commitment
to the security alliance, Mr. Reischauer believes It would be signaling to
Japan that they are in fact not an equal partner and are not worthy of the
same commitment that we have made to Europe. This change in the Japan-
United States relationship, real or unintended, will inexorably set the
Japanese on the path of massive, probably nuclear, rearmament in order to
protect their interests and prove their equality. The ghost of the
Washington Naval Conference will come back to haunt us all.
The challenge and the dilemma in Japanese defense and security policy
in the decade of the 1970' s is to adapt to the new realities of the multi-
polar world in a way that will have to look not only at what ships or guns
or planes she needs but at the nature of her politics and her Constitution.
This task looks as large today as economic recovery must have looked in
September 1951. But, if Japan is to be a truly great nation, it must be done,

EPILOGUE
The ten months since the above essay was written have been pivotal,
perhaps seminal, ones for Japanese decision makers. A number of inter-
related events have served to both highlight the deficiencies in Japanese
security and foreign policy making and underscore the necessity for change.
On July 5, 1972, Tanaka Kakuei was elected Prime Minister, succeeding
the retiring Sato Eisaku. With Tanaka' s election, foreign policy again was
caught up in domestic intraparty factional politics. During the period since
the announcement of President Nixon's visit to China, Sato had openly ex-
pressed his desire to visit Peking and begin the process of normalization
of relations. A successful resolution of this sticky problem coming on top
of Okinawa reversion would be an impressive capstone of a long political
career. This desire was to remain no more than a wish for two reasons:
first, because support for the Nationalists was one of the policies supported
by the mainstream factional alliance and, second, because the Chinese flatly
and publicly refused to deal with the Sato government, thereby hoping to
influence a choice of successor.
With Sato's impending retirement, anti-mainstream factions seized upon
China policy "failures" as an issue to use against the Prime Minister's
handpicked successor, Fukuda Takeo. All contenders for Prime Minister now
favored recognition of Peking though it should be noted that only Miki
Takeo had previously supported such a policy. In the intraparty factional
struggle, Tanaka deserted the Sato mainstream and announced support for a
new China policy in an effort to rally support from outside the mainstream.
In this, he was successful, winning 282 to 190. Japan was now wedded to a
Seattle Post-Intelligencer (July 5, 1972), p. Al.
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new China policy not because of security reasons or as the result of a
rationalized policy but because of the vicissitudes of factional politics.
With the Japanese government now publicly committed to normalization,
and as part of an effort to loosen Japan-U.S. ties and balance Soviet pres-
sure, Peking quickly invited Tanaka to visit China. The event occurred
September 25 to 29.
In a joint communique, Japan recognized "the Goverment of the People's
Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China" and both govern-
ments" . . . decided upon the establishment of diplomatic relations as from
2
September 29, 1972." The Chinese waived war indemnities, and both countries
agreed to hold negotiations for conclusion of a peace treaty at a date in the
future. At the same time, Japan broke relations with the Nationalists.
Does normalization of relations represent a new appreciation of real-
politik and the imperatives of the Asian scene in Japanese diplomacy? The
answer is "no." The evidence suggests that Japan will continue to remain an
essentially passive actor, moving in an ad hoc manner in response to external
stimulus. Recognition was only possible because of the Nixon visit and, as
noted above, was more a response to intraparty factional pressures than
reasoned policy. The Japanese embassy in Tapei remained open for business as
usual after relations were severed, and officials "purposely avoided trying
3
to define the present status of their relations." The embassy finally closed,
but its place has been taken by an "Exchange Association" indirectly funded
by the Japanese government. This "association" confidently predicts expansion
2
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of trade at a rate of 10% a year. Japan has not solved the China problem,
only the players have swapped places.
Recognition of the Peoples Republic cannot help but draw Japan further
into regional politics and pose security problems. The Chinese are clearly
aware of the possible implications of regional involvement. An appreciation
of realpolitik more than Marxist ideology is behind Chou En-lai's statement
that Japan's "economic expansion is bound to bring about military expansion."
Although the Japanese do not appear to fully appreciate the implications,
Japan's tremendous trade aid and investment in East Asia necessarily must
make her more concerned with regional political stability. Unless peace breaks
out in Asia, she will necessarily need the means and the will to promote
stability.
The East Asian region has not become more stable during the last 10
months. Despite recent efforts at reproachment , there is still tension be-
tween the two Koreas. Taiwan is now a question mark. Fighting continues in
Indochina. The Philippines and Thailand are now combating insurgency. All
these are areas where Japan has a vested interest in stability. But the most
significant events of the last ten months have been changes in the Japan-US
relationship which signal that Japan can no longer hold the old assumptions
about the Japan-US security arrangement.
The United States physical involvement in Viet Nam had not only con-
tributed to overall regional stability but had provided evidence of willingness
of US commitment to Japan's security interests in East Asia. This involvement
has ended under circumstances which probably preclude military reinvolvement
4
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in the region. In any event, the war in Vietnam has clearly demonstrated
the limits of great power capacity to influence regional affairs.
As important as the security implications of US withdrawal are changes
in economic relations between the two countries which have developed during
the last 10 months. The Japan-US security relationship has been only part
of a larger assumed relationship between the two countries. The other part
of the relationship has been the economic one. While US policy makers can
and do separate them, this is less easy for the Japanese who have posited
their postwar diplomacy in economic terms.
The conditions the economic relationship has produced have resulted in
a chronic US imbalance in bilateral trade. The economic shocks of 1971 and
efforts to have Japan realign internal domestic conditions which favor
Japanese business have not reversed this condition. Partly as a result, the
dollar was again devalued in February 1973, thus forcing an approximate 34%
revaluation of the Yen in little over 18 months. More significantly, the US
has officially adopted an essentially adversary relationship with Japan on
economic matters. In February, US chief trade negotiator William Eberle
warned Japan to take action on trade problems "within 90 days or face the
consequences." At the same time, the President asked for authorization to
adjust tariffs as he feels necessary.
The new foreign policy charted by the United States over the last few
years in response to new pressures envisions a diplomatically active multi-
polar power structure as the guarantor of regional stability. Implicit in
this is that a certain amount of conflict of interest is inevitable, even
6
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desirable, in efforts at maintaining stability. In this shifting multi-
polar world, the status of the Japan-US relationship will never be certain.
Yet, from the Japanese point of view, the stability of this relationship has
been assumed. Her entire postwar defense and security policies have been
postulated on this premise.
In conclusion, it seems appropriate to look again at Ambassador
Reischauer's statement that the greatest shock would be not to treat Japan
as an equal. United States policy in the last 10 months has not been doing
this. (In fact, it has been directed toward the opposite goal.) But, given
the assumptions forced upon the Japanese by the vagrancies of history and
politics, the view from Tokyo most likely is that we are.

Appendix A
THE SELF DEFENSE FORCES
The Self Defense Forces are organized in three branches (ground,
maritime and air) within the Japan Defense Agency. By law, the Prime
Minister is Commander in Chief. Subject to his command and supervision,
the Defense Agency is run by a Director General. The Director General
exercises his authority through the uniformed chiefs of staff. Unlike the
prewar army, civilian authority over the SDF is complete and within the
Defense Agency no uniformed officers occupy a position higher than section
chief.
The strength of the SDF grew steadily during the period 1954 to 1958 and
has since leveled off. Actual strength has run about 90 percent of author-
ized. The following table provides statistics for 1954 to 1970:
Authorized and Actual Personnel ,
In Self-Defense Forces, 1954-1970
Totals for SDF
Authorized Actual Percent
1954 152,095 111,177 73.0
1955 179,737 156,834 87.2
1956 197,182 181,681 92.2
1957 204,105 191,854 94.0
1958 222,102 207,803 93.5
1959 230,935 214,682 93.0
1960 230,934 206,001 89.2
1961 242,009 209,015 86.4
1962 243,923 215,649 88.4
1963 243,923 212,904 87.3
1964 246,094 216,268 87.9
1965 246,094 225,450 91.6
1966 246,094 226,280 92.1
1967 250,372 231,436 92.4
1968 250,372 234,935 93.8
1969 258,074 235,564 91.3




Japanese defense expenditures have been moderate in absolute terms
and relatively low in terms of percentage of Gross National Product and
budget. Figures for the period 1960 to 1971 are tabulated below:
2
Japanese Defense Expenditures (Unit $1 million)
Year Expenditure Percentage Percentage Percentage
of GNP of National
Income
of Budget
1960 444.0 1.34 9.07
1962 606.3 1.01 1.24 8.34
1963 687.5 1.00 1.24 8.10
1964 780.0 0.98 1.24 8.41
1965 848.3 0.97 1.22 8.16
1966 958.6 0.94 1.18 7.71
1967 1,075.0 0.90 1.12 7.44
1968 1,171.6 0.80 1.05 7.13
1969 1,374.7 0.84 1.06 7.14
1970 1,581.0 0.79 0.99 7.16
1971 1,863.6 0.80 7.13
As can be seen by these figures, although the defense budget has been
falling as a percentage of both GNP and National income, the actual dollar
outlay has been doubling approximately every four years.
The SDF is equipped with modern first line conventional equipment. As
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NIKE missle launchers 102
Japan is currently producing almost all the material needs of the SDF
in house. Major weapons systems such as the Type 61 tank, PS-1 seaplane,
escort vessels, submarines and the supersonic XT-2 trainer are being pro-
duced from domestic designs. Japanese industry is producing the F-104J
fighter (now phased out), HAWK and NIKE missies and the BADGE air Defense
System under license. Recent licensing agreements will permit the F-4
fighter to be produced domestically.
The current fourth defense buildup plan (1972-76) announced in October
1970 is estimated to run approximately $16.7 billion over the five year period,
This is about 2.2 times the total cost of the third (1967-71) plan. Under the
plan, personnel strength will remain essentially unchanged. The GSDF will have
a total of 990 tanks, 270 more armored cars and 230 more helicopters. The
ASDF will replace its older fighters with six squadrons of F-4EJ fighters.
A major update of the MSDF is contemplated. Nineteen more escorts will be
procurred, including 2 helicopter carriers; 9 more submarines will also be























Instrument of Surrender signed
Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan announced
South Sakhalin and Kuriles incorporated into
Region of Khabarovsk
New Constitution becomes effective
Limited private trade permitted by SCAP
Discussions with U.S. representatives over Peace
Treaty
Korean War begins
SCAP directs formation of National Police Reserve
Discussions over Peace Treaty resume
49 nations sign multilateral peace treaty with
Japan; bilateral security treaty signed
















ROK announces Rhee Line
Negotiations open with ROK for normalization of
relations
Peace Treaty signed with Republic of China, San
Francisco multilateral peace treaty and bilateral
security treaty enter into force
Japan admitted to International Monetary Fund and
International Bank for Reconstruction
Barter trade with PRC begins
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement signed
Safety Force reorganized into Self Defense Forces
Negotiations with USSR for Peace Treaty begin
Peace Agreement with Soviet Union signed
Japan admitted to United Nations
4th Private Trade Agreement with PRC
Agreement reached with U.S. to revise Security
Treaty
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security signed
Treaty ratified in Diet (May-June riots)




1961 April 4 DPRK resident repatriation begins
1962 November 9 L-T Trade Memorandum signed
1963 August 14 Japan signs Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
August 20 Export of Vinylon plant to PRC approved
December 30 Nationalists recall Charge d' Affairs
1964 May 30 Yoshida letter re Export-Import credits
November Ikeda succeeded by Sato; Japan adopts "higher
posture" in international affairs
1965 December 8 Treaty on basic relations with ROK ratified
1969 November 21 Nixon-Sato joint communique and Sato Press Club
speech
1970 February 3 Japan signs NPT
March 15 Expo 70 opens in Osaka
June 22 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
automatically extended
October 20 White Paper on Defense issued; 4th Defense Plan
announced
1971 June 17 Agreement on reversion of Ryukuys reached with U.S.
July 17 U.S. announces President will visit PRC
August 15 U.S. imposes 10 percent surcharge on imports; floats
dollar
October Japan supports U.S. efforts to seat PRC in U.N. while
retaining Taiwan seat; effort partially successful
October 15 U.S. -Japan Textile Agreement (immediate 30% cut in
exports)
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